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Abstract
This thesis investigates the impact of Official Development Assistance (ODA)
on the donor’s economy in the case of Switzerland. As a first step, chapter 1
discusses a flow-of-funds approach to quantify the impact of bilateral and
multilateral ODA on the donor country’s economy. The simple yet rigorous
methodology employed allows to compute both, the primary (immediate) and
the final impacts of ODA on the domestic GDP. We find for the year 2014
a primary effect of around 70 to 90 centimes for each Swiss franc of ODA
provided. Regarding the final effect, computed by means of a Keynesian
multiplier, it is found to lie between 1.19-1.56 franc.
In addition to these effects, ODA, particularly bilateral ODA, may induce
exports from the donor to the recipient countries. This hypothesis is tested in
the following chapters using time-series and structural econometric modeling
based on panel data.
Chapter 2, as a preliminary step towards chapter 3, discusses and further
develops a statistical method, namely the Dumitrescu-Hurlin (DH) Granger
non-causality test that enables the verification of causal links between any
pair of time series based on panel data. In particular, the chapter presents
the user-written command xtgcause, implemented in the Stata software that
allows for the computation of DH Granger non-causality tests.
Chapter 3 employs the method discussed in chapter 2 to investigate the
existence and direction of Granger causality between Swiss bilateral ODA and
Swiss exports. The results reveal foremost bidirectional Granger causality. In
other words, exports from Switzerland to the recipient countries are Granger-
caused by ODA flows and vice-versa.
Finally, chapter 4 measures the magnitude of the induced effect of bilat-
eral ODA on Swiss exports. To this end, an augmented-gravity trade model
is employed. The results point towards a return through exports of 0.59 USD
for each 1 USD of ODA allocated in the short run (static model) and of up
to 1.73 USD in the long run (dynamic model).
These results are important in terms of policy implications on several
accounts, not the least of which is providing decision makers with a more
comprehensive view of the (real) costs of ODA.
Keywords: donor country, official development assistance, exports, flow-of-
funds approach, Granger causality, gravity model, panel datasets.
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Résumé
Cette thèse analyse l’impact économique de l’Aide Publique au Développe-
ment (APD) sur le pays donateur pour le cas de la Suisse. Comme première
étape, le chapitre 1 discute d’une approche “flux de fonds” pour quantifier
l’impact de l’APD bilatérale et multilatérale sur l’économie du pays dona-
teur. Cette méthodologie simple mais rigoureuse, permet de calculer l’impact
primaire (immédiat) ainsi que l’impact final de l’APD sur l’économie domes-
tique. Nous trouvons, pour l’année 2014, un effet primaire se situant entre
70 et 90 centimes pour chaque franc suisse fourni. Concernant l’effet final,
calculé à l’aide d’un multiplicateur keynésien, il se situe entre 1,19 et 1,56
franc.
En plus de ces effets, l’APD, en particulier l’APD bilatérale, peut induire
des exportations du pays donateurs vers les pays receveurs. Cette hypothèse
est testée dans les chapitres suivants à l’aide d’analyse de séries temporelles et
de modélisation économétrique structurelle basées sur des données de panel.
Le chapitre 2, comme étape préliminaire en vue du chapitre 3, discute
et développe une méthode statistique, à savoir le test de non-causalité de
Granger élaboré par Dumitrescu et Hurlin (DH), qui permet la détection
de liens de causalité entre n’importe quelle paire de séries temporelles basée
sur des données de panel. En particulier, le chapitre présente la commande
xtgcause, implémentée dans le logiciel Stata et qui permet d’effectuer des
“DH Granger non-causality tests”.
Le chapitre 3, utilise la méthode décrite dans le chapitre 2 pour examiner
l’existence et le sens de causalité entre l’aide publique bilatérale suisse et les
exportations suisses. Les résultats révèlent une causalité bidirectionnelle au
sens de Granger. En d’autres termes, les exportations suisses vers les pays
receveurs d’APD sont Granger-causées par les flux d’APD et vice-versa.
Finalement, le chapitre 4 mesure l’ampleur de l’effet induit de l’APD
bilatérale sur les exportations suisses. Pour ce faire, un modèle gravitationnel
de commerce international est utilisé. Les résultats montrent un retour de
l’APD à travers les exportations de 0,59 USD pour chaque USD d’APD alloué
à court terme (modèle statique) et de jusqu’à 1,73 USD à long terme (modèle
dynamique).
Les résultats obtenus sont importants en termes d’implications politiques
et ce pour plusieurs raisons, notamment en fournissant aux preneurs de dé-
cisions une vision plus complète du coût (réel) de l’APD.
Mots-clés: pays donateur, aide publique au développement, exportations,
approche flux de fonds, causalité au sens de Granger, modèle gravitationnel,
données de panel.
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General Introduction
This thesis is about investigating the impact of Official Development Assis-
tance (ODA) on the donor country’s economy, in the case of Switzerland.
In its own way, each of the four chapters comprising the thesis provides an
answer, or at least part of the answer, to this non-trivial research question.
Before discussing the motivation of this thesis and briefly presenting the con-
tent of each article, it is worth giving a broad-spectrum overview of ODA in
general and Swiss ODA in particular.
1 General overview
The first international financial flows measured date back to the 15th century
when rich and powerful European families lent money throughout Europe.
However, these international capital flows from private sources were profit
oriented, differentiating them from international assistance flows, the ODA
ancestor. Even if international assistance originated in the 19th century,
mainly in the United States, Great Britain and France, the origin of modern
ODA can be situated in the mid-20th century, after World War 2, spurred
by the United Nations. Among the first ODA flows stand the ones arising
from the Marshall Plan. The present section looks at the definition of ODA,
answers the questions of who manages the concept of ODA, who provides
ODA (donors), how much and why, who receives ODA (recipients), in what
form and finally what are the main criticisms addressed to ODA?
1.1 Definition of ODA
Official development assistance is a concept used and defined by the De-
velopment Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD) as a measure of international aid
flows.1
Each word composing the acronym ODA contributes to building its defi-
nition. Indeed, “official” means that the assistance must come from an official
source, which in this case means a public institution (usually the government,
central and/or local level). Therefore, ODA does not include assistance di-
rectly provided by households, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) or
private firms. Nonetheless, these private actors could still channel ODA on
1It should be noted that assistance/aid directed to countries/territories that are on
Part II (more advanced developing countries/territories) of the DAC list of aid recipients
is called Official Aid (OA).
1
behalf of the public institutions. In other words, they act as the govern-
ment’s executing agencies. Considering only public assistance is obviously
restrictive but since the concept of ODA refers to the responsibility of gov-
ernments, which are accountable internationally of their assistance policy,
the measurement of ODA is drastically facilitated.
The word “development” refers to the primary objective ODA should
achieve, namely promote economic development and welfare of the recipi-
ents. More recently the DAC referred to the Sustainable Development Goals
(SDGs) introduced by the United Nations. Thus, to be considered as ODA,
assistance is meant to be directed to developing countries/territories.
Finally, the word “assistance” has been purposely chosen as a broad term.
Indeed, to help recipients to develop, government and public agencies have
a wide range of instruments at their disposal: e.g. loans (with specific con-
ditions attached), grants, knowledge transfers, donations in kind, funding
projects and programmes, etc. Although the DAC has defined eligible activ-
ities, the list remains almost infinite. This is why the word “assistance” has
been preferred to other terms, such as “donations”, “loans” or “money”. The
term “aid” is frequently used instead of “assistance”.2
1.2 ODA governing bodies
Not every activity of a developed nation directed to a less-developed coun-
try/territory is considered as ODA. As we just mentioned, one of the tasks
of the Development Assistance Committee is to provide clear definitions of
eligible activities and financial assistance that can be considered as ODA.
The DAC also plays the role of coordinator between all the member coun-
tries. The committee was set up in 1960, a little more than a decade after
the origin of modern ODA, under the auspices of the OECD’s forerunner, the
Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC) and in Septem-
ber 1961 by a Ministerial Resolution of the new OECD. Data collection on
ODA started in 1960.
At the national level, each contributor has its own governing body or
bodies responsible of defining and implementing ODA policies. Sometimes
the body is an entity in itself and sometimes a mix of different public agen-
cies that collaborate to take the ODA-related decisions. The national ODA
governing body usually decides how to allocate ODA to which recipient, and
more importantly, what effort will be made in providing ODA. Key decisions
2This is true no matter the recipient country, that is Part I or Part II of the DAC
recipients’ list.
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on ODA are however, in many donor countries, subject to the approval of
the state authorities, as is the case for other government expenses.
1.3 Who provides ODA, how much and why?
The term ODA refers not only to a statistical concept but also to an interna-
tional system of resource transfer between donors and recipients. The donors
are organized by the DAC, which is composed of 29 member countries and
the European Union. Currently, the 30 DAC members are 24 European coun-
tries3 (including EU), and Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, South
Korea, and the United States. Most of the time total ODA figures used in
reports refer to these 30 DAC members (or 29 given that the European Union
is often not considered). However, ODA figures sometimes also include as-
sistance reported to the DAC by non-DAC members. The countries (around
20) included in this latter group do not fulfill all the DAC requirements to be
members, but still provide ODA flows on a regular basis. Sometimes those
countries are referred to as the “emerging” donors, which include developed
and relatively rich nations from all over the world, such as Israel, Kuwait,
Malta, Russia, Thailand, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates among oth-
ers.
The OECD reported that in 2017, ODA (from DAC and non-DAC mem-
bers) amounted to around 178,000 million USD (current price). As we will
show later, this number represents only around 0.3% of the donors’ GNI (on
average), but still, about 33% of the Swiss GNI. With respect to the Least
Developed Countries (LDCs), on average, ODA flows represented in 2016
around 4.6% of their GNI (World Bank database). This ratio even goes up
to 10% for some LDCs recipients. The fact that total ODA represents such
a large amount of money and implies so much in terms of the recipients’
budget, gives credence to the present thesis. Indeed, results found regarding
the impact of ODA on the donor country’s economy, particularly Switzer-
land that is a major donor as we will discover later, may impact substantially
ODA provided and therefore many developing countries/territories.
The DAC members have contributed to around 92% of the 2017 total
ODA amount. The top five donors are, in order, United States, Germany,
United Kingdom, Japan and France. Interestingly and although in a different
order, the top five donors were the same in 1960. Total ODA (from DAC
and non-DAC members) in constant prices has remained roughly constant
3Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portu-
gal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and United Kingdom.
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since the early 1970s (at around 80,000 million USD). However, since the
beginning of this century, total ODA has strongly grown as table 1 shows:
Table 1: Total ODA in US dollars, millions, constant prices (2016)
2000 2005 2010 2015 2017
80,961 128,976 137,738 162,057 175,324
It should be noted that the significant growth between 2000 and 2005 is
mainly driven by the important (and highest ever measured, i.e. 28%) an-
nual ODA growth between 2004 and 2005. The main factors explaining this
growth rate are the debt relief for Iraq and Nigeria agreed by the Paris Club
(USD 19.4 billion) and ODA provided following the devastating December
2004 Indian Ocean tsunami (USD 2.2 billion).
If the focus is on the “effort” of providing ODA (i.e. ODA/GNI) rather
than on the absolute amount, the picture is very different. In 2017, the
country putting the highest effort in providing ODA is a non-DAC mem-
ber, namely the United Arab Emirates with a ratio of ODA/GNI equal to
1.31%. The four following countries are Sweden, Luxembourg, Norway and
Turkey. The average effort of all the 2017 donors is 0.38% whereas the one of
the DAC members for this same year is 0.31%. Thus, emerging donors are,
on average, putting relatively more effort in providing ODA than the DAC
members. Figure 1 shows the DAC members’ effort (there is no sufficient
data on non-DAC members to include them in the time series) in providing
ODA. During the first decade, in the 1960s, the level of ODA was quite high,
but declining, probably because of the phasing out post-WW2 reconstruc-
tion effort. Thereafter, ODA effort of the DAC members remained roughly
constant, at around 0.3%.
Note that the quantitative objective set until 1969 by the United Nations
Assembly was 1% of the donors’ GNI. Todays, the objective is 0.7%, which
obviously is not reached either. A working committee established by the
World Bank in 1969 and led by Lester Pearson, a former Canadian prime
minister, has proposed the current target.
1.4 Why ODA?
To the almost philosophical question, what are the motives of the donors to
provide ODA, Charnoz and Severino (2015) propose five arguments based on
the theory of international relations, namely the quest of power, the “capital-
4
Figure 1: ODA effort, DAC members
ist” exploitation, the quest of material welfare, the pursuit of private interests
and the moral fulfillment.4
• The quest of power. As any international action, providing ODA
gives the donor visibility and increases its relative power. Further-
more, based upon the amount of aid, a donor country can reward,
or the opposite, sanction, a specific country or region, establishing a
domination-based relationship towards the recipients.
• The “capitalist” exploitation. In a context where countries are ei-
ther “capitalist” or “proletarian”, exporting capital, no matter the pur-
pose, strengthens the position of a capitalist country and contributes
to the exploitation of the proletarian countries.
• The quest of material welfare. In this case, donors spend on aid
not to gain power or to reinforce their dominance but simply because
providing ODA allows recipients to be better-off which implies for the
donor future potential commercial relationships with the assisted coun-
tries. In other words, ODA is not a zero-sum game, it is an investment.
• The pursuit of private interests. According to this line of argu-
ment, the donor has no interest in the recipient’s development. ODA
4An alternative contribution on aid allocation is the one of McKinlay and Little (1977)
that developed an analytic model of aid allocation (donor’s perspective). They find that
imperialistic behavior of the donor is the model best explaining the allocation of aid (based
on U.S. data).
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is provided by governments who may encourage foreign aid for private
purposes like for instance to satisfy exporters’ lobbies.
• The moral fulfillment. ODA is provided to fulfill the moral duty
wealthy and developed countries have regarding their less-developed
peers. This does not necessarily mean that donors admit a share of the
responsibility regarding the recipients’ current economic situation.
In fact, it is very difficult if not impossible to fully comprehend the donors’
motivations for providing ODA. Whatever the reasons are, it is believed
that providing ODA does economically impact the donor. Martínez-Zarzoso
et al. (2009) discuss three reasons why ODA may affect positively the donor’s
economy, in particular its exports. First, the authors mention that ODA can
be tied to the donor’s goods and services implying automatically a positive
impact on its aggregate demand (even though it could be argued that some
of the exports arising from tied aid would have occurred anyway with or
without ODA). It should be noted at this point that untied aid can also
imply a positive impact on the donor’s aggregate demand, and that together
tied and untied aid may be the root of supplementary positive effects on
the aggregate demand. The first chapter of the present thesis discusses this
issue extensively. Second, and related to the possibility to provide ODA in
the form of national goods and services, the recipient country may develop
a dependence towards the donor’s goods and services. This habit-formation
effect, as discussed by Djajić et al. (2004), may imply future exports from
the donor to the recipient, since assistance flows can cause a gradual shift
in the consumption preferences in favor of the donor’s goods and services.
Finally, yet importantly, when a recipient receives assistance from a donor,
this relationship may alter, in a positive way, the perception the recipient
has towards the donor (goodwill effect). Thus, trade relations may emerge in
either the short run or the long run because of ODA. Chapter 3 and 4 of this
thesis precisely aim at, respectively, investigate the presence of a statistical
causal relationship between ODA and exports and quantify the effect ODA
induces on the donor’s exports.
1.5 Who receives ODA?
As for the donors, DAC decides who should belong to the list of recipi-
ent countries/territories. Currently DAC revises the list of recipients ev-
ery three years. The list for the period 2018-2021 comprises no less than
143 countries/territories. The criteria used to decide the status of recipient
are twofold. First, are considered as recipients all the countries/territories
6
identified by the United Nations as Least Developed Countries, that is, 47
countries/territories for the years to come. The identification of the LDCs
by the UN is based on the countries/territories’ GNI as well as on two com-
posite indexes, namely the Human Asset Index that considers the coun-
tries/territories’ level of nutrition, health, education and adult literacy and
the Economic Vulnerability Index that takes into account eight different cri-
teria.5 Second, are also listed as recipients low- and middle-income coun-
tries/territories as defined by the World Bank (respectively 2 and 94 coun-
tries/territories6 for the period 2018-2021). For the World Bank, low- and
middle-income countries/territories have a GNI per capita (in US dollars
and calculated using the World Bank Atlas method) below USD 12,235 (in
2016).7 It is commonly agreed that as far as possible, LDCs should be helped
in priority given that, in addition to be very poor (very low GNI per capita),
they also face some other severe problems. Some of the emerging donors can
potentially also be considered as recipients, like in the cases of Thailand and
Turkey.
OECD data on ODA disbursements to countries/territories and regions
highlight which geographical areas are receiving the highest share of ODA.
Figure 2 shows that since the mid-1970s, the region receiving the highest
share of ODA is the Sub-Saharan Africa.
5The eight criteria retained by the UN are: population size; remoteness; merchandise
export concentration; share of agriculture, forestry and fisheries; share of population in
low elevated coastal zones; instability of exports of goods and services; victims of natural
disasters and instability of agricultural production.
6The middle-income group is often further divided in two, the lower and the upper
middle-income groups.
7The WB thresholds are mainly based on operational thresholds. For instance, the
low-income group of countries threshold has been set in 1989 relying on the operational
threshold for “civil works preference”.
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Figure 2: ODA by region: DAC members
According to Charnoz and Severino (2015), the poorest countries receive the
highest share of ODA. This observation is in line with figure 2 above since
on average the poorest countries are the sub-Saharan African countries.
1.6 Destination and forms of ODA
Despite the absolute necessity to respect the DAC requirements regarding the
eligibility criteria ODA needs to fulfill, each donor still has a considerable
leeway regarding the sector to which its ODA is directed as well as the
form it takes.8 Indeed, regardless of the sector (with the exception of “debt
relief”), ODA can either be in the form of goods and services (G&S) or in
the form of pure financial flows (with the possibility to attach “strings”, i.e.
conditionalities on how to use the funds). Furthermore, ODA can be directly
allocated to a country (bilateral ODA) or indirectly through international
organizations (multilateral ODA) which channel the ODA collected towards
recipient countries. In 2016, around 70% of ODA was bilateral. The fact
that ODA can be in the form of G&S and that financial flows can be subject
to conditionalities gives the possibility to donor countries to provide tied aid,
that is aid provided in the form of the donor G&S (necessarily). In the early
2000s, DAC emitted recommendations to untie aid, which caused, according
8The OECD considers eight sectors, namely social infrastructure, economic infras-
tructure, production, multisector, program assistance, debt relief, humanitarian aid and
unspecified.
8
to OECD, a large drop of the share of tied aid from around 80% in the 2000s
to less than 20% nowadays.9
1.7 Main criticisms addressed to the measurement of
ODA
As we have seen, DAC is the body deciding what can or cannot be considered
as ODA. Thus, most of the criticisms are linked to the decisions of the DAC
on including or excluding specific flows. The probably most discussed issue
over the past years is the degree of concessionality a loan must show to be
considered as ODA. Hynes and Scott (2013) discuss extensively this issue.
The authors note that even after many years of debate, and the choice of a
minimum 25% share of grant elements in a loan, it still remains a topic of
discussion. The same applies to the fixed 10% discount rate which is used in
calculating the grant element of a loan, determined in 1972 and never changed
since. Nowadays, the 10% discount rate is obviously too high compared to
market interest rates, and therefore artificially increases the grant element of
a loan. This facilitates commercial loans to be considered as ODA.
A second debated example is the fact that ODA includes study and school
fees for students originating from the recipient countries. However, if those
students do not go back to their countries of origin, should those fees really
be considered as ODA? Alternatively, even if the students go back to their
country, do those expenditures really help the recipient countries to develop?
In the same vein: should the expenditures on the hospitality and travel
expenses of the refugees be considered as ODA? The return of refugees in their
home country, after a period, will not necessarily help the recipient country
to grow; on the other hand, the hosting of refugees may ease the international
climate and therefore favor the development of the less developed (mainly
the ones at the border of the country in conflict).
To summarize, if there are some expenditures that are globally accepted as
being ODA (e.g. expenses in water supply and sanitation or disaster preven-
tion among others), others cause much ink to flow. Hynes and Scott (2013)
discuss the contemporary ODA concept and show its main drawbacks. In a
second step, the authors propose an alternative aggregate measure, namely
the Official Development Effort (ODE), which excludes some controversial
expenditures such as student’s fee and spending on refugees, and include
only the donation part of loans. Their contribution precedes the one by
Roodman (2014) that as a first step also analyzed which current expendi-
9The fundamental reason why DAC encourages donor countries to untie their aid is
that tying aid may increase the costs of a development project.
9
tures should not be part of ODA anymore and which ones should be included.
Then, the author proposed a new method to more accurately compute the
grant elements of a loan, which will in turn be accounted as ODA instead of
the loan itself (as also proposed by Hynes and Scott (2013)).
2 Swiss context
With roughly eight million inhabitants, Switzerland is one of the less popu-
lated DAC members but on the other hand one of the wealthiest. This latter
fact allows Switzerland to be above the median DAC members’ donors in
terms of ODA in US dollars (ranked 13th in 2017 and 12th in 1960). Figure
3 shows the Swiss ODA contributions since 1960. As it can be seen, it is only
towards the end of the 1970s that Swiss contributions have really started
to increase.10 The significant drop of Swiss ODA contributions last year
(2017) is predominantly due to an important decrease of Swiss expenditures
on asylum and to a lesser degree to the adjustments to DAC’s guidelines on
computing asylum-related costs. For the purposes of saving money, the Swiss
government has not allocated the funds saved in another form of assistance.
Figure 3: Swiss ODA disbursement
Note: The 1992 peak is due to extraordinary debt relief measures for the 700th anniver-
sary of the Swiss confederation and Switzerland’s accession to the Bretton Woods
institutions.
By plotting the share of ODA relative to GNI (figure 4), Switzerland
shows a performance more in line with its prosperous nation status, especially
since the early 1990s with a ratio above the average of all DAC members.
10Switzerland became a DAC member in 1968. The increase of ODA contributions in
the late 1970s is mainly due to the incorporation of humanitarian aid as ODA in 1977.
10
Figure 4: Switzerland vs DAC members ODA effort
Since 2014, the Swiss effort in providing ODA oscillates around 0.5% of
GNI, in accordance with the decision of the Parliament in 2011 to increase
Switzerland’s contribution to 0.5% of its GNI by 2015. As it can be seen
in figure 5 below, the current Swiss effort in providing ODA is among the
highest.
Figure 5: DAC members ODA effort, 2017
In 2016, Switzerland provided ODA to slightly more than 100 countries
and territories. Figure 6, based on OECD data, shows the geographic distri-
bution of Swiss ODA across different regions of the world. As a whole, Swiss
11
ODA spread is similar to the global one (figure 2), the sub-Saharan Africa
region being the area receiving the highest share of Swiss ODA.11
Figure 6: Swiss ODA by region
Note: On the graph, only eight regions can be distinguished because Swiss ODA con-
tributions towards Oceania are very small.
Finally, one specific feature of Switzerland is the high share of untied aid
it provides. The DAC/OECD started to collect data on the tying status
in 1979. Figure 7 shows the average share of untied aid12 for the 27 donor
countries for which data are available.
11No evidence of ODA allocation bias, as for instance in Arvin and Drewes (1998) who
analyze Canada, was found regarding Swiss ODA.
12The untied aid share is defined as the proportion of untied aid relative to total ODA
excluding partially tied aid and negative commitments.
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Figure 7: Untied aid share, DAC members
Switzerland stands among the top five countries, with an average share
of 84%. Note that the ratio for Switzerland moved upwards to 96% for the
period 2000-2016. However, as already mentioned, providing untied aid, i.e.
behaving altruistically, does not mean that returns on ODA for the donor
are proportionally lower. On one hand a high share could indeed lead to
lower purchases of goods and services from the donor’s economy, but on
the other hand, untied aid may foster (possibly more that tied aid) the so-
called goodwill effect. Moreover, Arvin et al. (1996) have shown in their
contribution, based on Canadian data, that untied aid does have indeed a
lingering/persistent impact on exports.13 With a ratio of untied aid close to
unity, Switzerland is a very interesting country to investigate.
3 Motivation and contributions
There is a large number of academic studies on ODA. Economically, there
are at least two broad research topics, namely 1) does ODA really help the
recipient country to develop? and 2) does ODA imply any economic benefit
for the donor? The literature on the first topic is vast and the methods and
models used to answer that simple but non-trivial question are manifold. A
striking observation is that no clear answer is provided by the existing lit-
erature. Some authors argue that ODA helps a recipient only if the latter
satisfies specific demographic and economic features; others claim that no
13In reality, the frontier between tied and untied aid can sometimes be thin. For
instance, ODA in the form of technical cooperation, usually accounted as untied ODA,
implies mostly purchases of goods and services from the donor country.
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matter the characteristics of the recipient, ODA does help them to develop;
finally, some assert that ODA has no significant impact on the recipient coun-
tries’ capability to grow. Concerning the second topic, the existing literature
is much more limited. Although this is understandable given the main ob-
jective of ODA, at least four reasons can be given/cited for the importance
of analyzing the economic impact of ODA on the donors.
First, by definition, ODA is financed by public resources and the govern-
ment in democratic countries is accountable to the taxpayers who will foot
the bill in the last resort. Taxpayers want to know what are the risks and
gains from providing ODA and what is the true opportunity cost of ODA
in terms of forgone, present and future consumption. An inspection of the
economic benefits of ODA for the donor country responds to those legitimate
needs.
Second, it may be crucial for a given donor country to know if ODA
produces a significant impact on its economy, in particular through exports.
Indeed, in open economies, exports are a major driver of income and growth.
Thus, failing to measure the effect of ODA on exports would for instance
underestimate the consequences of a cut in ODA.
Third, as we have seen in the previous two sections, ODA is not a marginal
amount or concept. On the contrary, for some recipients ODA represents
one-tenth of their budget. Even though total ODA in constant prices has
more than doubled since the beginning of the century, the donors’ effort in
providing ODA stagnates since more than a decade. The plan is however to
increase this effort in the coming years. ODA provided is increasing in scale,
and thus deserves more attention from the scientific community at large.
Last but not least, except for some donor countries, namely Luxembourg
and the Scandinavian countries among a few others, the target of 0.7% of
GNI has not (yet) been reached. Thus, if ODA is found to positively influence
the donor’s economy, it may be a strong argument for the governments to
increase their effort and reach the 0.7% share of GNI initially put forward by
the Dutch economist and Nobel Prize winner Jan Tinbergen and reaffirmed
by the UN within its millennium development goal target.
This thesis is composed of four chapters, each of them corresponding to
an empirical contribution. The order of the chapters is basically governed
by the structure (constraints) imposed on data. Chapter 2, co-authored, has
already been published (Lopez and Weber (2017)). The remainder will be
hopefully submitted for publication in peer-reviewed journals in due time.
Chapter 1 presents and discusses extensively a flow-of-funds approach
to quantify the impact of official development assistance on the donor coun-
try’s economy. In particular, it looks at the economic impact of the different
ways public resources allocated to ODA are spent in the donor’s country by
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the donor itself, the recipient countries and the various partners of ODA-
financed aid projects and programmes. Based on Swiss data for the year
2014, and following a simple yet rigorous methodology, the primary (imme-
diate) and final impacts of Swiss ODA on the domestic aggregate-demand
(GDP) are computed. In a nutshell, results show that, for each franc spent,
Swiss ODA has a return lying somewhere between 0.70-0.90 Swiss franc in
terms of the immediate impact and 1.19-1.56 franc by integrating the mul-
tiplier effect. ODA’s effect on employment for that same year is roughly
estimated at around 25,000 full-time equivalents. This chapter also provides
some useful guidelines and recommendations for future implementations of
the methodology in Switzerland and other donor countries.
The second and third chapters are related to each other given that the
former implements and further develops the econometric techniques employed
in the latter.
Chapter 2 presents the Stata user-written command xtgcause, which
implements and further develops a procedure proposed by Dumitrescu and
Hurlin (2012) for detecting Granger causality in heterogeneous panel datasets.
The main advantages of this procedure are twofold. First, it enables the user
to conduct Granger causality tests, initially developed in a purely time series
framework (Granger (1969, 1980)), within a panel involving the observation
of multiple individuals (countries) over time. Second, it allows for hetero-
geneity of the causal relationships. In other words, Granger causality can be
found for the panel even though such causality is not present for some indi-
viduals. This chapter also discusses a further salient feature of the xtgcause
command that gives practitioners the possibility to select the optimal num-
ber of lags to include in the models by minimizing the Akaike Information
Criterion (AIC), Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC), or Hannan-Quinn
Information Criterion (HQIC). The optimal lag selection is a major issue in
time-series modelling since an inappropriate selection of the number of lags
can lead to wrong conclusions as we show in the chapter.
Chapter 3 uses the technique discussed in chapter 2 to investigate the
direction of Granger causality (i.e. temporal precedence), if such causality
there is, between Swiss bilateral official development assistance and Swiss
exports for a panel of 50 recipients over the period 1974-2016. To account for
possible geographical effects, three specific groups of recipient countries are
considered, namely “Africa”, “Latin America” and “Asia”. To shed light on
potential level effects, four other groups of countries are considered according
to the relative amount of ODA, respectively exports, flows Switzerland has
maintained with a given recipient country throughout the whole period. As
a necessary first step, four different panel unit root tests are run on each
series of all eight panels and results systematically indicate stationary series
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in levels. Then, to test for Granger causality, Dumitrescu-Hurlin Granger
non-causality tests are conducted. Results indicate bidirectional Granger
causality in all panels. This finding augurs well for the fourth and last chapter
of the thesis.
Chapter 4 estimates a structural econometric model to investigate the
relationship between Swiss bilateral ODA and exports in the recipient coun-
tries based on a panel of 95 recipient countries over 51 years. More precisely,
we use an augmented gravity model of trade in order to quantify the impact
of Swiss bilateral ODA on Swiss exports while controlling for standard vari-
ables such as exchange rate, GDP or free trade agreements. The results point
towards a statistically significant relationship between the two variables. The
average return on ODA (through exports) is estimated at 0.59 USD for each
1 USD donated in the short run (static model) and up to 1.73 USD in the
long run (dynamic model). These effects (magnitude and significance) vary
substantially when groups of recipient countries are formed based on their
geographical location or the magnitude of bilateral ODA or export flows they
receive from Switzerland (same criteria as in chapter 3). In particular, return
on ODA turns out to be statistically significant if ODA is directed toward
countries to which Switzerland exports the least but donates the most or to-
ward African or Asian countries (rather than to Latin American or European
countries).
To summarize, Swiss ODA does produce positive economic returns for
the home country. Specifically, bilateral ODA and exports are found to
be statistically linked, both in the short run and in the long run. This
observation leads to some policy implications that are discussed in the general
conclusion. The general conclusion also presents some general limitations of
the present thesis and more importantly provides some further research ideas.
16
Chapter 1: Measuring the
Impact of Official Development
Assistance on the Swiss
Economy: A Flow-of-Funds
Approach∗
1 Introduction
Official Development Assistance (ODA) has a single and outright priority,
namely helping developing countries to economically progress and enhance
their welfare. To be considered as ODA, assistance contributions must orig-
inate from the government (central or local) and meet the eligibility criteria
prescribed by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC).
ODA flows have been subject to numerous studies mostly dealing with
ODA’s impact on the beneficiary countries (aid efficiency issue). A smaller
number of studies have focused on the donor countries themselves. The
latter topic is of primary interest in the present contribution. Although
ODA is often seen as an altruistic act, i.e. a pure donation without any
expected impact on the donor’s economy, the reality is different. First, ODA
is not necessarily a donation. For instance, a loan to a recipient that is
concessional in character with a grant element of at least 25% is considered as
an ODA contribution according to DAC standards. Furthermore, assistance
to recipient countries can come in the form of goods and services purchased
in the donor country, thereby conveying some economic benefits to the donor.
In fact, the donor government or its executing agencies have the possibility
to purchase domestic goods and services to be sent to the recipient countries.
In the same vein, resident experts can be mandated to contribute to ODA-
related programmes and projects. Even though the experts’ findings and
activities are targeted to benefit the recipients, their salaries are likely to be
∗This paper is co-authored with Alain Schönenberger. The results discussed in this
chapter emanate from a study - based on 2014 data - commissioned by the Swiss Agency
for Development and Cooperation (SDC) and the State Secretariat for Economic Affairs
(SECO). The research project was directed by Prof. Gilles Carbonnier (Graduate Institute
of International and Development Studies, Geneva) and Prof. Milad Zarin-Nejadan (Uni-
versity of Neuchâtel). The project report submitted to SDC/SECO in 2015 was written
by the authors of the present chapter together with Dr. Moez Ouni and Mr. Lorenzo La
Spada.
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at least partially spent in their home country. Thus, the question of how and
where ODA is spent determines the magnitude of the economic benefits for
the donor.
In addition to these direct impacts on the donor’s aggregate demand,
bilateral ODA contributions from the donor government can also be the trig-
gering element of supplementary aid flows activated by NGOs and other insti-
tutions (i.e. the executing agencies of the government), implying a “leverage”
effect on the donor’s aggregate demand for goods and services. Finally, yet
importantly, multilateral ODA contributions to international organizations
may give rise to an indirect effect on the donor’s economy by entailing expen-
ditures from international bodies in the donor country that would otherwise
not have occurred.
Considering the above-mentioned facts, a thorough examination of the
spending behavior of all the actors involved, i.e. the government as the direct
provider of ODA, the NGOs involved in aid and cooperation activities, as
well as all other institutions, private firms and international organizations
that are providing aid flows, is needed. All these ODA-related spending on
goods and services of the donor (primary effect) increase the domestic GDP
by more than the total value of goods and services sold. Moreover, by means
of a multiplier, estimated on the basis of macroeconomic parameters, it is
possible to derive an estimation of the final effect of ODA on the donor’s
GDP. The number obtained can then be used to roughly evaluate the effect
on employment. In the case of Switzerland and for the year 2014, we estimate
the primary effect on aggregate demand for goods and services purchased in
the country to be in the range of 70 to 90 centimes for each Swiss franc of
ODA. The final effect on GDP ranges between 1.19 and 1.56 Swiss franc.14
As for the resulting impact on Swiss employment, it is roughly estimated
at around 25,000 full-time equivalents, which represent about 0.6% of Swiss
employment (full-time equivalent).
This flow-of-funds approach described above, focusing on the economic
impact of procurements derived from ODA programmes and projects, has
the virtue of relying on a large set of available data and transparent calcu-
lations. If information is missing but needed, imputations are made based
on reasonable, evidence-based hypotheses. Furthermore, the methodology
used generates an estimate of the economic benefits of ODA-related spend-
ing on the donor economy without the restrictions imposed by any economic
model and resorting to econometric techniques. It also has the advantage
of providing useful insights on the impact of ODA on the donor’s economy,
which can be easily communicated to decision makers and the general pub-
14Schönenberger et al. (2015).
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lic. On the other hand, not all effects of ODA on the donor economy can
be accounted for. This is true for instance for the growth-induced imports
of the recipient countries (exports for the donor) or goodwill effects on trade
and direct investment. The flow-of-funds approach can at best give a lower
bound estimate of the total domestic effects of ODA.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief
literature review. Section 3 goes through the methodology employed. Section
4 presents and discusses the results for Switzerland in 2014. Section 5 points
out the limitations of the methodology and provides directions for future
improvements. Section 6 concludes and mentions some policy implications.
2 Literature review
This section reviews the limited number of studies which have used the flow-
of-funds methodology to compute the economic impact of ODA on the donor
country. To the best of our knowledge, the first contribution on the economic
“fallout” of ODA for the donor country is the study by Hyson and Strout
(1968). In their contribution the authors estimate the impact of foreign aid
on U.S. exports over the years 1960 to 1965 in three-steps. First, they assess
the effectiveness of foreign aid on the economic growth of the recipient coun-
tries. Then, based on the estimation of the growth effect of the aid flows,
they calculate the increase of the demand for imports of the recipient coun-
tries. Finally, using U.S. trade shares in those recipient countries, the authors
quantify the impact of foreign aid on U.S. exports. The estimated impact is
unsurprisingly large given the fact that “the federal government has adopted
the policy of maximizing the procurement of goods in the United States for
all projects financed with Official Development Assistance”. Around 60% of
the total increase of U.S. commodity exports towards the analyzed set of re-
cipient countries was attributed to U.S. foreign aid, of which about two thirds
were the outcome of U.S. foreign assistance tying policy and one third the
result of increases in income in the recipient countries generated by U.S. for-
eign aid. Note however that the authors did not consider the direct spending
by U.S. aid on the domestic markets of goods and services (administration,
U.S. experts). Hyson and Strout are, to a certain extent, the pioneers of the
empirical analysis on the existing links between foreign development aid and
export performance of the donor country.
Nearly two decades later, Schumacher (1984) analyzed the impact on
employment of bilateral ODA flows by studying the direct effect on Ger-
man (former Federal Republic of Germany) exports of goods and services
purchased in relation with tied and untied aid as well as financial transfers
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which cofinance local initiatives and investment projects promoting economic
development of the recipient countries. As an additional beneficial impact of
ODA on German employment, the author also considered technical cooper-
ation consisting of employing experts with their equipment in the recipient
countries and training of local staff. Furthermore, he also included the ex-
ports of Germany resulting from ODA activities of multilateral institutions
and the bilateral ODA by other donor countries (as well as private direct
investment in developing countries). The author warns the reader about the
fact that resulting economic growth of the recipient country can actually
have a negative impact on employment in the donor country since more fa-
vorable economic conditions in the former encourage local production and
consumption, possibly provoking import substitutions.
The author used input-output modeling, thus accounting for the direct
effect on the industries benefitting from ODA-related exports and the in-
direct induced effect through purchases of intermediate goods and service
provided by other sectors. For the year 1982, he found a return on bilateral
ODA of around 32,000 full-time equivalent positions to which one could add
18,000 employments if private engagements on aid projects and programmes,
not included in the official assistance figures, are taken into account. Then,
he found that the contracts obtained in the international tendering proce-
dure by German firms and institutions for the delivery of goods and services
in relation to the aid programmes and projects financed by the multilat-
eral institutions (World Bank, UNDP, European Development Fund EDF,
and the regional development banks) accounted for approximatively 35,000
employments. Bilateral ODA of the other donors implied 16,000 additional
employments. Last but not least, the author also considered the additional
(German) exports induced by ODA flows directed to other recipient countries
(not on the list of countries of cooperation) and estimated the corresponding
impact on employment at around 24,000 jobs. In total, he estimated the
return on ODA in terms of employment to reach 125,000 positions in 1982.
Note that using the same methodology, May et al. (1989) reported for the
year 1985 an employment effect of ODA of 120,000 in Germany, which repre-
sented at that time around 0.4% of the total employment. The authors also
reported that the British team of the joint research project found for Great
Britain an ODA return of 75,000 jobs (around 0.3% of total employment).
Fitzpatrick and Storey (1988) carried out a flow-of-funds study to mea-
sure the economic benefits of ODA on Ireland as a donor country. The
authors adopted a cost-benefit approach. They considered as costs total
ODA contributions but also two additional elements that can be construed
as opportunity costs of providing ODA. The first one is the fact that Irish
workers employed as a result of bilateral or multilateral aid cannot be used
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to produce goods and services to satisfy the domestic demand. Secondly,
when goods and services are produced for ODA-financed purchases, physi-
cal capital is used which becomes unavailable to produce other goods and
services. The authors mitigate however the importance of these opportu-
nity costs which greatly depend on the pre-existing degree of utilization of
these resources. At the time of the study, Irish unemployment was indeed
high. Unemployed resources, of the quality required by the ODA-induced
production, have therefore a lower opportunity cost compared to a situation
of full capacity utilization. Regarding benefits, the authors consider the ex-
penses, from bilateral aid programmes, in form of purchases of Irish goods
and services as well as employment opportunities for the residents. They
also consider the sales of goods and services and consultancy by national
firms and organizations to multilateral agencies to which the Irish govern-
ment contributed (multilateral ODA). The authors further mention, without
being able to measure it, that the development of contacts and goodwill
overseas should be considered as an additional benefit of ODA flows. They
conclude however that, even if it is clear that ODA produces economic ben-
efits for the donor, these effects do not outweigh the economic costs (i.e.
cost-benefit ratio exceeds unity).
Recently, Schönenberger et al. (2012) estimated for the year 2010 the
effect of Austrian ODA on GDP. To do so, the authors employed the same
methodology as the one we discuss below (section 3), slightly modified to
take into account some specific features of the Austrian ODA. The authors
found a primary effect of around 53 cents for each euro of Austrian ODA and
a final effect of about 66 cents. Regarding Austrian employment, the impact
was roughly estimated between 8,300 and 10,600 full-time equivalent (0.2 to
0.3% of total employment).
Regarding Switzerland, the first study using the flow-of-funds approach,
followed by subsequent quadrennial studies, was undertaken on behalf of
the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) by Forster et al.
(1996). The methodology used, quite similar to the approach employed by
Fitzpatrick and Storey (1988), is presented in detail in the next section based
on the report for the year 2014. The authors estimated for the year 1994
the primary and final effects of ODA on the Swiss economy. They found
a primary effect of ODA expenditure on aggregate demand of between 0.90
and 1.02 Swiss franc for each franc of ODA. Then, by including the impact
of estimated Keynesian multipliers, the final effect - i.e. increase in GDP -
was estimated between 1.55 and 1.79 Swiss franc. In terms of employment,
a positive impact of roughly 16,000 to 23,000 full-time equivalent positions
was reported (0.5 to 0.7% of total employment).
Even though the contributions reviewed above all use a flow-of-funds
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approach, the results are not strictly comparable, not the least because of
important institutional differences among the countries. Besides, differences
in the composition and definition of ODA exist between the countries, partly
related to the time frame. Furthermore, the methods used to estimate the
economic impact (on GDP and employment) can be very different. In par-
ticular, when using an input-output approach for taking into account the
existing links between sectors via intermediate goods and services, results
would be undoubtedly different (most probably higher) compared to those
obtained by a simple multiplier. Also, the “indirect effect” induced by ODA
is not comparable across studies. For instance, Schumacher (1984) includes
the effect on the donor economy of bilateral ODA from other donors. Last but
not least, some studies focus on the effect of ODA on employment whereas
others report results in terms of aggregate demand (GDP).
3 Methodology
This section presents in detail the flow-of-funds approach used in this paper.
It corresponds to the most recent quadrennial Swiss study conducted for the
year 2014. In particular, we describe how total ODA flows are decomposed in
two distinct categories (contrary to the three categories the DAC considers).
Then, it will be explained how the two types of financial flows considered
produce different effects on the donor’s aggregate demand. Finally, the Key-
nesian multiplier is computed and applied to the primary effect of ODA.
The multiplier serves to calculate the final effect on GDP and, by means
of official figures on average labor productivity, the corresponding full-time
employment generated.
Based on the nature of ODA provided by government, the flows as they
appear in public accounts can be divided into three distinct categories, namely,
bilateral, multi-bilateral and multilateral15 . Bilateral ODA programmes and
projects are negotiated and implemented by the recipient and the donor.
Multi-bilateral ODA is spent on programmes and projects designed and ex-
ecuted by international organizations but financed by the donor country in
specific recipient countries. The third category of ODA refers to financial re-
sources allocated to international organizations either to contribute to their
overhead or to finance specific development projects but without the donor
being able to decide to which recipient the funds are directed. The DAC con-
siders multi-bilateral ODA as bilateral ODA because the assistance is geared
to a specific recipient country. For our purposes, however, multi-bilateral
15A glossary defining the terms and ODA-related effects to which we refer is available
at the end of this paper, after the appendices.
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and multilateral ODA are assumed to produce the same kind of effect on
the donor country’s aggregate demand. Thus, those two types of flows are
therefore subsumed in one single category, namely multilateral ODA (in the
broad sense). Figure 1 below exhibits the different types of ODA.
Figure 1: Total ODA decomposition
Bilateral ODA produces two distinct effects on the aggregate demand,
namely a direct effect and a leverage effect.
Regardless of the donor country, the allocated resources for bilateral ODA
are spent on goods and services except if they represent a pure financial
flow (e.g. general contribution to the recipient’s budget and debt relief). A
donor can buy goods and services (e.g. agricultural equipment) from any
country in the world, and then import them into the recipient country. It is
also possible that the national or foreign executing agency in charge of an
ODA project decides or co-decides what to buy and from which countries.
Similarly, the donor or its executing agencies may mandate experts from any
country to deliver services in the recipient country. Some of the funds will
be spent on goods and services emanating from the donor country even if
the ODA is not tied (i.e. conditional on purchasing goods and services from
the ODA provider country). This might be the case because the national
producers of the goods and services needed are competitive or for reasons
related to domestic policy goals. Note that the costs of administering various
programmes and projects are included in the definition of ODA, so that
automatically part of the budget is necessarily spent in the donor country
(e.g. public administration, overhead and resident employees of executing
agencies).
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The part of the bilateral ODA budgetary allocation which is spent in the
donor country has a direct effect on the latter’s aggregate demand for goods
and services.16 The direct effects are estimated by examining how (much)
government bodies providing ODA and their executing agencies, usually a
small number, spend in the donor country. Most of the executing agen-
cies mandated for carrying out or supervising the programmes or projects
have their headquarters in the donor countries. It is therefore necessary to
look for data on how and where those organizations spend the funds which
have been allocated to them. The information can be gathered by question-
naire and/or personal interviews. In general, to be time and cost efficient,
not all individual parties are contacted and questioned. A representative
set of stakeholders should however be consulted, if possible, and the results
extrapolated to the total spending of the ODA category examined. The
questionnaires/interviews typically ask for information on how the project
funds are spent (mainly salaries and social security contributions, purchase
of goods and services, and possibly other important spending items such as
direct transfers or interest charges) and of course what proportion of each
item is spent in the donor country. The survey also collects information on
the existence of private sources of funds, which might complement the ODA
funds, in order to account for a possible leverage effect.
The leverage effect of bilateral ODA occurs when existing ODA donations
attract matching funds. Indeed, available ODA financing is often comple-
mented by private (or even some foreign public) sources.17 A share of these
additional funds, like the bilateral ODA funds themselves, are spent on the
donor’s goods and services (including work remuneration). Thus, bilateral
ODA, but not exclusively, is prone to entail, through additional contribu-
tions, a leverage effect on the donor’s aggregate demand. For the ODA
financed projects and programmes, the executing agencies, private or public,
must keep an exact record of the spending and its allocation. However, addi-
tional private funding, not necessarily included in the official project request,
is unfortunately not subject to the same scrutiny by the public or govern-
ment. This complicates the approximation of the so-called leverage effect. In
16Providing ODA in the form of national goods and services does not mean that aid is
tied. Indeed, tied aid is defined as an aid provided under the explicit condition that it will
be used to purchase goods or services from the donor country. Switzerland, compared to
other countries, has traditionally had a relatively low proportion of tied programmes and
projects (see for instance Berthélemy (2006) who categorizes Switzerland as the most altru-
istic donor of the panel due to the low share of tied aid the country provides). Presently, in
most OECD countries, only a small part of ODA is conditional in terms of the destination
of the funds.
17It is assumed that government contributions attract additional donations and not the
other way around.
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the earlier Swiss studies, no limit on the possible leverage effect of bilateral
ODA was set. Because the data collected and subsequently used regard-
ing the leverage effect were not always representative (enough) and reliable
(e.g. not necessarily closely connected to the ODA-financed programmes and
projects), for the 2010 study, a 50% ceiling was set for the leverage effect (un-
less detailed recent reliable information were available). We kept the same
leverage effect ceiling for the 2014 report. In other words, it is assumed that
bilateral ODA of 1,000 CHF enabled the mobilization of private funds of up
to 500 CHF. Alternatively, one can also include all purely private funded
projects in the estimations (in the same vein as Schumacher (1984)), but
with the risk of overestimating the leverage effect.
Multilateral ODA comprises contributions by national governments to
the financing of aid projects and programmes promoted by international or-
ganizations. Typically, a programme might be financed by several donors. In
general, goods and services of some importance (i.e. beyond a certain thresh-
old) are spent following a tendering procedure at the international level. If
firms and organizations in the donor country win the tender, then the funds
spent have a greater likelihood to benefit the donor’s economy. This effect
is called indirect since the purchases in the donor country are in principle,
by regulation and contracts, not linked to the individual contributions to
international organizations. However, it is true that only contributing coun-
tries can participate in the tendering process. Likewise, it is also possible
that donor countries may preferably fund programmes within international
organizations from which they are most likely to benefit.
In practice, most of the important international organizations receiving
multilateral ODA, e.g. the UN, or the regional Development Banks, keep a
database on their contracts and can provide a list of organizations and firms
which provided goods and services co-financed by ODA funds. It should be
noted that if the beneficiaries are internationally active Swiss NGOs or Swiss
multinational firms (as opposed to national), the impact of their contracts on
the aggregate demand (primary effect) is expected to be smaller. In the ex-
treme case, a contract given to a very large international corporation whose
headquarters are located in the donor country might be executed entirely
abroad with no significant impact on the donor’s economy. Acknowledging
this fact, and based on data collected on ODA co-financed contracts, two vari-
ants for the indirect effect have been considered and computed. The lower
bound (LB) comprises expenditures made to Swiss-based companies produc-
ing in Switzerland (territorial criterion) whereas the upper bound (UB) also
includes expenditures directed overseas to the subsidiaries of the Swiss com-
panies (national criterion). Also note that many contracts run over several
years, and only the disbursements during the year of interest should of course
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be retained.
The primary effect of ODA mentioned above on the aggregate demand is
the sum of the three types of aid spending effects, namely the direct, leverage
and indirect effects (figure 2).
Figure 2: ODA types of aid spending effects
Put differently, the primary effect is the measure of the immediate impact
of ODA on the donor’s aggregate demand for goods and services. According
to the well-known Keynesian multiplier process, the primary effect gives rise
to a second round of expenditures on the donor country goods and services,
then a third round, and so forth thereby increasing aggregate demand and
GDP. The size of the multiplier effect depends, for a given primary effect, on
the behavior of households and firms, represented by macroeconomic param-
eters determining consumption (i.e. marginal propensity to consume out of
disposable income) and imports (i.e. marginal propensity to import).18 The
marginal propensities to consume and to import we used in the 2014 Swiss re-
port are derived from the econometric equations for private consumption and
18Note that large purchases might increase investment demand thereby, everything
being equal, enhancing the multiplier effect (“accelerator principle”). For a simple but
thorough exposition of the multiplier, see Peacock and Shaw (1976). A discussion of the
“crowding out” effect of an increase of aggregate demand, mentioned in the section below
on the limitation of the Keynesian multiplier linked to an increase in public spending (e.g.
in ODA expenditure), can be found in Shaw (1971).
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imports estimated by Mattei (2007) in the framework of his macroeconomic
model of the Swiss economy.
Since ODA impacts the economic circuit differently in terms of value
added (primary effect) depending on the nature of the spending, a different
multiplier is computed to obtain the direct, indirect and leverage final effects.
For instance, the purchase of goods has a smaller multiplier effect compared
to the payment of consultancy fees. Indeed, for an equal initial sum, the
former has a lower percentage of value added (salaries). Typically, the esti-
mated value of the short-run multiplier could be smaller than one in the case
of purchases of consumption goods, but higher than one for salaries which
represent a larger direct contribution to value-added. Large differences in the
percentage of value added in turnover exist even within the manufacturing
industry.
Consequently, three multipliers depending on the nature of the primary
impact of spending on the economic circuit are used to calculate the GDP
impact of ODA (see diagrams in appendix A). The algebraic expressions of
these multipliers (k1, k2, k3) are reported in appendix B.19
The sum of the primary effect of ODA and the multiplier effect constitutes
the final effect of ODA on the donor’s GDP (figure 3). The time necessary for
the whole multiplier process to be completed depends mainly on the economic
agents’ behavior and reaction.
Figure 3: ODA final effect
Algebraically, the final effect (FE) of ODA is given by:
FE = k1BODA+ k2LF + k3IO
where BODA, LF and IO stand for, respectively, bilateral ODA, levied
funds (thanks to bilateral ODA contributions) and multilateral ODA-related
aid expenditures from international organizations towards Switzerland (two
bounds are considered as discussed above). The terms k1BODA, k2LF and
k3IO therefore represent, respectively, the direct, leverage and indirect final
effects.
Given the estimated increase of GDP, the impact on employment (cor-
responding to full-time equivalent employment) can be roughly computed
19See Forster et al. (1996) for more detailed information on the multipliers.
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by using average20 labor productivity. As discussed, the impact of ODA on
the donor country’s GDP occurs through the purchase of goods and services
(including experts’ remunerations). Thus, depending on the share of the sec-
tors benefiting from ODA spending, the appropriate average productivity of
labor should be used to compute the impact on employment. For instance, if
the primary effect relates to the purchase of goods, the average productivity
of labor in the manufacturing industry may be used. On the contrary, if the
primary effect is due to the purchase of services, the service sector average
productivity of labor would be more appropriate. An average or weighted
productivity of labor can also be employed.
Average productivity of labor of industrial and service sectors differ con-
siderably in Switzerland. As the data collected do not differentiate between
the purchases (primary increase of aggregate demand) among sectors and
industries within the direct, leverage and indirect effects, it is necessary to
choose, for the computation of the employment effect, a single value for the
average labor productivity (value added divided by full-time equivalent po-
sitions) derived from the production account of the Swiss national accounts
(data available on the Swiss Federal Statistical Office website. Two em-
ployment levels are computed: the lower bound of the employment effect is
calculated by using the average productivity of labor in the manufacturing
industry while the upper bound refers to the productivity of administra-
tive, technical and consulting activities. A unique estimation of the employ-
ment effect could be obtained for instance by using the labor productivity
of market-based activities (i.e. excluding the public sector). It is the latter
estimation that we use to provide a single figure for employment (see section
4).
Figure 4 below summarizes the different ways ODA can impact aggregate
demand and thereby GDP (and employment). Note that the figure includes
the potential effect ODA may have on the donor’s exports (induced exports
from the donor to the recipients and the so-called “goodwill” effect) which
are not taken into account in the pure “flow-of-funds” approach (see section 5
for a discussion on this issue).
20By using average productivity, the increase of employment is somewhat overestimated.
Ideally, one should use the lower marginal productivity of labor. However, this latter being
not observable, we use the average labor productivity.
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Figure 4: Summary of ODA’s effects on the donor’s economy
To sum up, a prime concern of the flow-of-funds approach, whatever the
type of effects (direct, leverage or indirect) considered, is to identify the na-
ture of the purchases and the destination of the funds, namely whether these
are directed to the donor country of interest or abroad (e.g. the recipient
countries). Regarding the nature of the purchases, a given sum devoted to
acquisitions of industrial goods has a relatively low multiplier effect on GDP
(value added) because a large part of the turnover covers the cost of inter-
mediate goods, as compared to expenditures on consultancy services which
largely consist of salaries and honorariums (value added). Thus, it is advis-
able to collect some information on the spending behavior of the domestic
cooperation partners in order to obtain accurate estimates of the primary
effect, including the location of experts commissioned. For instance, the cost
of expatriates consists mainly of their remuneration (including social security
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contributions), which is spent to some extent in the recipient countries but
certainly also in the country of residence, namely the donor country in most
cases of bilateral ODA. Thus, if the expert is physically located in the donor
country, then all his remuneration is deemed to have a positive impact on
domestic aggregate demand. However, if the expert is expatriated, only part
of his remuneration should be considered as impacting aggregate demand in
his home country, given that a share of his income will probably be spent in
the recipient country. In our study, it has been assumed that 65% of experts’
salaries is spent in the home country (i.e. Switzerland). This proportion was
determined as a result of informal discussions held with field experts and
SDC officials.21
Old-age and most of the other social security contributions, as part of
the labor costs, paid by the employer (donor country) and the expatriate
are considered as increasing aggregate demand, as the social insurances are
predominantly financed according to the pay-as-you-go principle. In this
case, social security contributions finance directly pensions which are spent
by the beneficiaries on good and services purchased in the donor country.
Technically, and to be coherent, social contributions to pension funds - the
so-called “second pillar” of the Swiss old-age pension system which capitalizes
the contributions until the pension age is reached - should be considered as
savings (therefore not impacting current aggregate demand).
Data requirement and treatment issues are briefly touched upon above
when describing the various steps in estimating the direct, leverage and in-
direct effects. However, the published data are not sufficient to calculate
the direct effect, let alone the leverage and indirect effects. Aggregate fig-
ures on ODA are provided and published in some details by the agencies in
charge of development aid. Nowadays, the official agencies, members of the
DAC/OECD, report their ODA spending items in the form of a harmonized
Creditor Reporting System, which allows to aggregate the data while preserv-
ing the detailed information for analysis22. Nevertheless, this concerns only
the different payments made by government and not the use of the funds by
the beneficiaries (usually the executing agencies). Therefore, it is necessary
to look for this information with the partners and executing organizations
21In the absence of any precise indication, previous Swiss studies mostly assumed that
the entire remuneration of Swiss-based experts was spent in Switzerland. Of course, this
assumption carried the risk of leading to a slight overestimation of the impact.
22The objective of the CRS Aid Activity database is to provide a set of readily available
basic data that enables analysis on where aid goes, what purposes it serves and what
policies it aims to implement, on a comparable basis for all DAC members. Data are
collected on individual projects and programmes. Focus is on financial data but some
descriptive information is also made available.
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by means of questionnaires and/or interviews, and to exploit available data
as well as qualitative information on spending patterns.
4 Results
In 2014 the total amount of Swiss ODA reached 3,009.295 million CHF ac-
cording to the officially published figures, including contributions by all fed-
eral offices as well as local and cantonal governments. The statistics also
break down total ODA into different categories (e.g. humanitarian aid, peace-
building and human security, economic and trade cooperation, etc.) of aid
and cooperation. The total sum spent is divided into bilateral and multi-
lateral ODA. In practice, detailed information on the composition of ODA
is provided by the two largest ODA spending federal agencies, namely SDC
and the State Secretariat for Economic Affairs (SECO). As explained in the
previous section, the missing information on how ODA funds are spent by
the executing agencies is obtained either through surveys, reports of activity
and interviews of experts and representatives of these institutions.
The results for the year 2014 are presented below in a graphical form
(numbers in thousands of CHF). In accordance with the methodology, two
bounds are computed regarding the indirect effect. Whereas the lower bound
does not include goods and services purchased from subsidiaries of Swiss com-
panies located abroad, the upper bound includes contracts awarded to Swiss
companies but whose deliveries might originate from a subsidiary abroad.
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Figure 5: ODA’s effects for Switzerland, 2014
The estimated effects can be related to the ODA categories in order to
show the comparative effect by franc of ODA and to allow meaningful com-
parisons over time. For instance, each Swiss franc of ODA allocated implies a
total primary effect (lower bound) of 0.70 Swiss franc (2,114,477/3,009,295).
Regarding the final effect, on average, each franc spent on ODA increases
GDP by 1.19 franc (lower bound) or 1.56 franc (upper bound).23
One might also consider the impact of ODA on the total demand for
goods and services by types of effects. Figure 6 shows the composition of the
primary effect according to the direct, indirect and leverage effects.
23The total effect of 1 Swiss franc of ODA on Swiss GDP (in francs) is given by
k1BODA+k2LF+k3IO
ODA .
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Figure 6: Primary effect decomposition
The leverage effect is negligible (2 centimes). The direct effect accounts
for around 0.45 franc and the indirect effect for 0.25 franc in the case of
the lower bound. The latter effect is increased, to some 0.45 franc if one
considers the upper bound, i.e. the purchases of goods and services from
Swiss based multinational by multilateral ODA institutions. The fact that
the indirect effect plays an important role in the computed return on ODA is
in line with the results of Carbonnier (2013) that highlights the potential link
between multilateral ODA and spending of international organizations in the
contributor country. Furthermore, according to the magnitude of the direct
effect, about half of ODA expenditures directly impact the Swiss economy.
The size of this effect appears all the more impressive in the light of the
largely untied nature of Swiss ODA.
Despite the mostly minor changes in the definition and composition of
ODA from 1994 onward, the results can be compared through time and
throughout the studies, with possibly the exception of 2010 (and 2014). In-
deed, in 2010 some significant revisions have been made in the methodology
to better reflect recent developments with regard to ODA expenses. For
comparison, the figures of 2006 have also been computed with the changes.
Table 1 below exhibits how the primary and total effects have evolved from
1994 to 2014.
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Table 1: Swiss ODA returns through time
By analyzing the figures of table 1, it turns out that the primary effects are
quite stable over years despite the revisions. On average, the primary effect
amounts to about 80 centimes for each Swiss franc of ODA. The estimated
total effects on GDP seem to be much more volatile and decreased in 2006
with the changes in the calculations. On average, between the upper and
lower bounds, one franc spent on ODA has an estimated return of 1.4 francs.
Unfortunately, the results obtained for Switzerland cannot really be com-
pared to those obtained for other donor countries, since the approaches fol-
lowed differ quite substantially across countries and studies as we mentioned
earlier. However, irrespective of the country studied and the precise method
used in the flow-of-funds approach, the estimated benefits for the donor of
providing ODA are found out to be relatively large.
5 Discussion and limitations
In the first place, we discuss possible extensions that could be made without
changing the methodology employed. Then, and even though the flow-of-
funds approach used is rather simple and straightforward, we explore some
of the assumptions that had to be made (in particular for the indirect and
leverage effects), often because of the lack of detailed and relevant informa-
tion. Finally, we discuss some underlying limitations of the flow-of-funds
method that can potentially lead to an overestimation or underestimation of
the impact of ODA on the donor’s economy.
A welcome extension and improvement of the present study would con-
sist of differentiating ODA’s effects across sectors by using an input-output
analysis, as done by Schumacher (1984). A purchase from one sector leads to
subsequent purchases of inputs from other sectors of the economy (or from
abroad). Thus, a meticulous analysis of the primary effect at the sectoral level
delivers more precise information on which economic sectors profit most from
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ODA, which can be politically important from the industrial and regional pol-
icy viewpoints. Such an extension commands that the sectoral destination
of each individual spending (contracts with an organization or a firm) be
identified. Unfortunately, this is not possible without an extended revision
of the data collection supported by the main national ODA governing bodies
(to encourage the executing agencies to collaborate) and an increase of the
associated work burden. The direction of the resulting changes in aggregate
demand and income depends on the sectoral composition of the spending.
For instance, some sectors might require large imported inputs (raw mate-
rials, semi-finished goods) whereas others have a much lower propensity to
import. Compared to the simple one-sector variant, the multiplier effect
might be larger or smaller.
The leverage effect takes into account the effect of ODA on levying private
funds for financing projects and programmes. It is implicitly assumed that
the availability of government funding increases the likelihood for NGOs
to raise complementary private financing for their projects. However, this
direction of causality can be put in question. Indeed, it may be that projects
are first conceived and implemented owing to private funds and then the
NGOs apply for complementary government funding (ODA). If this is the
case, the legitimacy of defining a leverage effect should be reconsidered. A
solution to this issue would be to conduct a survey on a certain number of
agencies involved in such projects in order to better grasp the direction of
causality, if causality there is. That being said, and regarding Switzerland,
the leverage effect is a negligible part of the primary effect, consequently
reducing this limitation. It should be noted at this point that one might also
consider all purely privately-funded aid projects and programmes, applying
the same eligibility criteria as for ODA (except of course for the origin of
funds), as Schumacher (1984) did for Germany.
The indirect effect is included because it is believed that international
organizations active in cooperation for development tend to spend their fi-
nancial resources in priority in countries that have provided them with mul-
tilateral ODA. This hypothesis remains to be tested. However, Carbonnier
(2013) found that multilateral ODA contributions might influence positively
the purchases by international organizations of goods and services from con-
tributing countries.
The present study does not consider the impact on aggregate demand of
the financing pattern of ODA. Indeed, if for instance expenditures on ODA
are financed by an increase in taxes, the ensuing impact on aggregate demand
is smaller than if ODA expenses are financed by an increase in government
debt. In the former case, the final effect is indeed reduced by an increase
in taxes which has a contractionary effect on the aggregate demand. In
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a purely Keynesian setting without a money market and price changes, the
balanced-budget multiplier, i.e. when government spending is financed by an
equivalent increase of taxes, is equal to one (Haavelmo’s theorem). Similar
effects arise when the government is subject to a budget constraint or a fiscal
rule whereby an increase in spending must be (partially) compensated by a
decrease in expenditure on other budgetary items.
The size of the multiplier effect also depends on other assumptions. There
are numerous effects which may mitigate the multiplier effect. At worst, the
multiplier will tend to zero, leaving only the primary effect of spending on
goods and services produced by the donor country. Most of the current
impact studies ignore potential crowding-out effects of spending. For in-
stance, the impact of (deficit-financed) ODA on the interest rate is ignored.
Rising interest rates can discourage (private) investment, thereby at least
partially offsetting the effect of ODA spending. A rise of the price level, for
instance when the economy is at full-employment level, reduces real money
supply, thereby acting as a contractionary monetary policy. The impact on
the interest rate would consequently be greater than under constant prices
and the resulting crowding-out effect stronger, cancelling out at least part
of the expansionary effect of an increase in ODA. The size of the crowding-
out effect will also depend on the exchange-rate regime (flexible or fixed)
via its impact on imports and exports of goods and services. Government
spending, financed by deficit, could also give rise to a contractionary effect
on private spending (via consumption), when households tend to save more
in order to be able to pay later additional taxes required to reimburse the
debt contracted (so-called Ricardian equivalence). However, as for the Swiss
economy, very small and largely open, some of the above-mentioned crowding
out mechanisms do not apply. For instance, the high mobility of capital and
abundance of savings is likely to preclude any increase of the interest rate
due to larger ODA spending.
Potential crowding-out effects are often ignored on the grounds that the
spending under scrutiny is relatively small compared to aggregate demand,
with negligible impact on other variables likely to influence the measured
impact in one way or another. In short, the final effect of the primary increase
of aggregate demand due to ODA spending would depend on the structure
and characteristics of the donor’s economy, especially the financing of the
ODA, and the degree of sophistication of the underlying macro-economic
model used in simulating an impact of ODA. However, one cannot rule out
that taking into account these variables change significantly the final effect
of ODA. That is why one should rely more on the primary effect than on the
final demand effect.
Ideally, instead of using a simple framework (as reflected by the Keynesian
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flow-of-funds diagram in Appendix A) like in the present study, one can use
a more sophisticated model in order to compute more realistic multipliers
(see for instance Batini et al. (2014) who discuss in detail the determinants
of the size of the fiscal multiplier in the context of fiscal policy). However, it
is not at all clear if expected gains in precision justify the costs of additional
complexity in terms of economic modeling and econometric techniques.
More fundamentally, a flow-of-funds approach may completely miss posi-
tive economic effects induced by ODA contributions in a long-term perspec-
tive, not captured by simply identifying and tracing monetary flows linked
to resulting spending. The methodology adopted takes into account indirect
effects such as the “return” through an increase in exports linked to mul-
tilateral aid programs financed by the donor country, but not collateral or
incidental effects of Swiss ODA on exports. Indeed, in the long run, bilateral
ODA tends to foster economic and financial relationships with the recipient
country that would not have occurred without ODA, thus facilitating trade
and investment between the two countries.
6 Conclusion
This contribution used a flow-of-funds approach to determine the economic
impact of ODA on the donor country. ODA has an impact on the donor’s
aggregate demand, at least due to the remuneration of the personnel in charge
of managing ODA. However, the economic benefits could be much larger
if the donor spends its ODA budget in a way that leads to purchases on
national goods and services. The extreme case is a totally tied aid (against
the international trend of untying aid and cooperation).
The leverage effect of bilateral ODA and the indirect effect of multilateral
ODA generate additional incomes that have to be taken into account. Alto-
gether, for 2014, we found a return of up to 1.56 Swiss franc for each franc
of ODA. This return, above unity, means that Switzerland, at least in the
short run, gains more income than the total amount spent of ODA. Depend-
ing on assumptions made in the course of the estimation procedure, it might
be possible that the computed effect is somewhat overestimated. On the
other hand, there are also reasons to believe that certain hypotheses made
or methods used could lead to an underestimation of the true effect. Thus,
if the magnitude of the effects is debatable, it can hardly be denied that
providing ODA does impact the donor’s economy positively. Even though
the donor does not provide ODA for its own benefit, the fact remains that
the economic return of ODA reduces its budgetary cost (or even exceeds it
when multiplier effects are taken into account).
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This observation has certain political consequences. Indeed, if decision
makers of any donor country were aware of the existence and the magnitude
of returns in terms of domestic aggregate demand, the amount of ODA might
not be the same. Depending on the return, ODA could even be considered
as an investment like direct foreign investments. More fundamentally, the
resources of governments are scarce and taxpayers have the right to know
how these resources are spent and what are the true opportunity costs of
the various government spending items, including ODA. Note also that the
knowledge of the true cost of ODA can well change the public perception of
aid efficiency. There are only a handful of empirical studies on the economic
fallouts of ODA estimated by using the data on the flow of funds while
many more exist on the incidental impact on export via goodwill, information
channels, induced growth and technical dependence (replacement investment,
norms). In order to facilitate comparison and interpretation across regions
and countries, it would certainly help if a unified methodology for such studies
could be put in place by DAC.
Finally, it has been mentioned in this contribution and in most of the
related literature that ODA flows may impact the donor country in ways that
are not revealed by the flow-of-funds approach. In particular, it is believed
that ODA contributions, especially bilateral flows, create a long-standing
relationship between the donor and the recipient, which enhances trade and
capital movements between the two countries to their mutual benefit. In
particular, as a result of ODA flows, the recipient country may be more
disposed to import goods and services from the donor country. Checking
the accuracy of this hypothesis and the magnitude of the long term effect
needs economic modeling and recourse to econometric techniques but would
cast light on an important issue. Indeed, depending on the results, ODA
could positively affect not only the recipients’ but also the donor countries’
long-term growth.
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Appendix A
Figure A.1: Diagram of the multiplier effect of bilateral ODA (direct effect)
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Figure A.2: Diagram of the multiplier effect of bilateral ODA (leverage effect)
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Figure A.3: Diagram of the multiplier effect of multilateral ODA (indirect
effect)
41
Appendix B
The direct effect’s multiplier k1, the leverage effect’s multiplier k2 and the
indirect effect’s multiplier k3 are:
k1 = υ1(b1−b)+(1−α1−µ1)(1+m˜b)+α11−b(1−m˜)
k2 = υ
′′
1 (b1−b)+(1−α
′′
1−µ
′′
1 )(1+m˜b)+α
′′
1
1−b(1−m˜)
k3 = 1+(1−α
′
1)m˜b
1−b(1−m˜)
where:
α1 share of Swiss G&S provided by Switzerland and purchased by inter-
national organizations,
α
′
1 share of G&S provided by Switzerland and purchased by international
organizations,
α
′′
1 share of G&S provided by Switzerland and purchased with funds
levied thanks to bilateral ODA,
b Swiss residents’ marginal propensity to consume (relative to gross
income),
b1 Swiss expatriate’s marginal propensity to consume (relative to gross
income),
m˜ marginal propensity to import relative to consumption,
µ1 share of imports in bilateral ODA,
µ
′′
1 share of imports in funds levied thanks to bilateral ODA,
υ1 share of expatriates’ salaries in bilateral ODA,
υ
′′
1 share of Swiss resident’s salaries in funds levied thanks to bilateral
ODA.
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Glossary
ODA Official Development Assistance. Must originate from
official agencies, i.e. state and local governments.
Can be provided either directly by the government
or through its executing agency.
DAC Development Assistance Committee (provides a pre-
cise statistical definition of ODA and coordinates its
member countries).
Donor Country providing ODA.
Recipient Country receiving ODA.
Bilateral ODA ODA contributions directly allocated to recipients (if
ODA contributions are allocated to international or-
ganizations to be further directed to specific recipi-
ents, they are considered in the present study as mul-
tilateral ODA.
Multilateral ODA
in the broad sense
ODA contributions allocated to international organi-
zations.
Executing agencies Bodies that allocate ODA funds on behalf of the donor
country. These can be NGOs, other institutions or
private firms (but mostly NGOs) if we refer to bilat-
eral ODA and international organizations if we refer
to multilateral ODA.
Direct effect Effect produced on the donor’s aggregate demand
through expenses on domestic goods and services (in-
cluding experts’ remunerations) using bilateral ODA
contributions.
Leverage effect Effect produced on the donor’s aggregate demand
through aid-related expenses on domestic goods
and services (including experts’ remunerations) using
funds collected by NGOs, other institutions or private
firms owing to bilateral ODA contributions received.
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Indirect effect Effect produced on the donor’s aggregate demand
through aid-related expenses on domestic goods and
services (including experts’ remunerations) by inter-
national organizations at least partially financed by
multilateral ODA.
Primary effect The sum of the direct, leverage and indirect effects.
Multiplier Coefficient obtained using detailed data on ODA, the
spending patterns of actors involved and macroeco-
nomic parameters. The number reflects the magni-
tude of the effect of an initial one-monetary-unit im-
pulse on the aggregate demand at the end of the Key-
nesian multiplier process.
Multiplier effect Magnitude of the total effect minus the initial impact.
Total or final effect Effect produced on the donor country’s GDP due to
ODA. Computed as the primary effect times the mul-
tiplier or the primary effect plus the multiplier effect.
Employment effect Effect on the donor’s employment computed as the
final effect divided by the average (apparent) produc-
tivity of labor.
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Chapter 2: Testing for Granger
Causality in Panel Data∗
1 Introduction
Panel datasets comprised of many individuals and many time periods are
becoming widely available. A particularly salient case is the growing avail-
ability of cross-country data over time. As a consequence, the focus of panel
data econometrics is shifting from micro panel, with large N and small T , to
macro panels, where both N and T are large. In this setting, classical issues
of time-series econometrics, such as (non-)stationarity and (non-)causality,
also arise. This paper discusses the user-written command xtgcause, which
implements a procedure recently developed by Dumitrescu and Hurlin (2012)
(hereafter DH) in order to test for Granger causality in panel datasets.
Considering the fast evolution of the literature, practitioners may find it
difficult to implement the latest econometric tests. In this paper, we there-
fore summarize the test built by DH and present xtgcause using examples
based on simulated and real data. The objective of our contribution is to
support the empirical literature using panel causality techniques. One re-
current concern being related to the selection of the number of lags to be
included in the estimations, we have implemented an extension of the test
based on Akaike, Bayesian, and Hannan-Quinn information criteria to facili-
tate this task. Finally, and to deal with the empirical issue of cross-sectional
dependence, we have implemented an option to compute p-values and critical
values based on a bootstrap procedure.
2 The Dumitrescu-Hurlin test
In a seminal paper, Granger (1969) developed a methodology for analyzing
the causal relationships between time series. Suppose xt and yt are two
stationary series. Then the following model:
yt = α +
K∑
k=1
γkyt−k +
K∑
k=1
βkxt−k + εt with t = 1, ..., T (1)
can be used to test whether x causes y. The basic idea is that if past values
of x are significant predictors of the current value of y even when past values
∗This paper is co-authored with Sylvain Weber and was published in the Stata Journal
(2017, volume 4: 972-984)
45
of y have been included in the model, then x exerts a causal influence on y.
Using (1), one might easily investigate this causality based on an F-test with
the following null hypothesis:
H0 : β1 = ... = βK = 0 (2)
If H0 is rejected, one can conclude that causality from x to y exists. The
x and y variables can of course be interchanged to test for causality in the
other direction, and it is possible to observe bidirectional causality (also
called feedback).
DH provide an extension designed to detect causality in panel data. The
underlying regression writes:
yi,t = αi+
K∑
k=1
γikyi,t−k+
K∑
k=1
βikxi,t−k+εi,t with i = 1, ..., N and t = 1, ..., T
(3)
where xi,t and yi,t are the observations of two stationary variables for indi-
vidual i in period t. Coefficients are allowed to differ across individuals (note
the i subscripts attached to coefficients) but are assumed time-invariant. The
lag order K is assumed to be identical for all individuals and the panel must
be balanced.
As in Granger (1969), the procedure to determine the existence of causal-
ity is to test for significant effects of past values of x on the present value of
y. The null hypothesis is therefore defined as:
H0 : βi1 = ... = βiK = 0 ∀ i = 1, ..., N (4)
which corresponds to the absence of causality for all individuals in the panel.
DH test assumes there can be causality for some individuals but not
necessarily for all. The alternative hypothesis thus writes:
H1 : βi1 = ... = βiK = 0 ∀ i = 1, ..., N1
βi1 6= 0 or ... or βiK 6= 0 ∀ i = N1 + 1, ..., N
where N1 ∈ [0, N − 1] is unknown. If N1 = 0, there is causality for all
individuals in the panel. N1 must be strictly smaller than N , otherwise there
is no causality for all individuals and H1 reduces to H0.
Against this backdrop, DH propose the following procedure: run the N
individual regressions implicitly enclosed in (3), perform F-tests of the K
linear hypotheses βi1 = ... = βiK = 0 to retrieve the individual Wald statistic
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Wi, and finally compute the average Wald statistic W :24
W = 1
N
N∑
i=1
Wi (5)
We emphasize that the test is designed to detect causality at the panel-
level, and rejecting H0 does not exclude non-causality for some individuals.
Using Monte Carlo simulations, DH show that W is asymptotically well-
behaved and can genuinely be used to investigate panel causality.
Under the assumption that the Wald statistics Wi are independently and
identically distributed across individuals, it can be shown that the standard-
ized statistic Z¯ when T →∞ first and then N →∞ (sometimes interpreted
as “T should be large relative to N”) follows a standard normal distribution:
Z¯ =
√
N
2K ·
(
W −K
)
d−−−−−→
T,N→∞
N (0, 1) (6)
Also, for a fixed T dimension with T > 5 + 3K, the approximated standard-
ized statistic Z˜ follows a standard normal distribution:
Z˜ =
√
N
2K ·
T − 3K − 5
T − 2K − 3 ·
T − 3K − 3
T − 3K − 1 ·W −K
 d−−−→
N→∞
N (0, 1) (7)
The testing procedure of the null hypothesis in (4) is finally based on Z¯
and Z˜. If these are larger than the standard critical values, then one should
reject H0 and conclude that Granger causality exists. For large N and T
panel datasets, Z¯ can be reasonably considered. For large N but relatively
small T datasets, Z˜ should be favored. Using Monte Carlo simulations, DH
have shown that the test exhibits very good finite sample properties, even
with both T and N small.
The lag order (K) selection is an empirical issue for which DH provide no
guidance. One way to tackle this issue is to select the number of lags based on
an information criterion (AIC/BIC/HQIC). In this process, all estimations
have to be conducted on a common sample in order to be nested and therefore
comparable.25 Practically, this implies that the first Kmax26 time periods
must be omitted during the entire lag selection process.
24See Dumitrescu and Hurlin (2012, p. 1453) for the mathematical definition of Wi.
Note however that T in DH’s formulas must be understood as the number of observations
remaining in the estimations, that is the number of periods minus the number of lags
included. In order to be consistent with our notation, we therefore replaced DH’s T by
T −K in the following formulas of the present paper.
25We thank Gareth Thomas (IHS Markit EViews) for bringing this point to our atten-
tion.
26Kmax stands for the maximum possible number of lags to be considered in the entire
procedure.
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Another empirical issue to consider in panel data is that of cross-sectional
dependence. To this end, a block bootstrap procedure is proposed in sec-
tion 6.2 of DH to compute bootstrapped critical values for Z¯ and Z˜ instead
of asymptotic critical values. The procedure is composed of the following
steps:27
1. Estimate (3) and obtain Z¯ and Z˜ as defined in (6) and (7).
2. Estimate the model under H0: yi,t = α0i +
∑K
k=1 γ
0
ikyi,t−k + εi,t, and
collect the residuals in matrix ε̂(T−K)×N .
3. Build a matrix ε?(T−K)×N by resampling (overlapping blocks of) rows
(i.e., time periods) of matrix ε̂. Block bootstrap is useful in presence
of autocorrelation.
4. Generate a random draw (y?1, ...,y?K)
′, with y?t =
(
y?1,t, y
?
2,t, · · · , y?N,t
)
,
by randomly selecting a block of K consecutive time periods with re-
placement (see Stine, 1987; Berkowitz and Kilian, 2000).
5. Construct the resampled series y?i,t = α̂0i+
∑K
k=1 β̂
0
iky
?
i,t−k+ε?i,t conditional
on the random draw for the first K periods.
6. Estimate the model: y?i,t = αbi +
∑K
k=1 γ
b
iky
?
i,t−k +
∑K
k=1 β
b
ikxi,t−k + εi,t,
and compute Z¯b and Z˜b.
7. Run B replications of steps 3 to 6.
8. Compute p-values and critical values for Z¯ and Z˜ based on the distri-
butions of Z¯b and Z˜b, b = 1, ..., B.
3 The xtgcause command
The syntax of xtgcause is as follows:
xtgcause depvar indepvar
[
if
][
in
][
, lags(# | aic [#] | bic [#] | hqic [#])
regress bootstrap breps(#) blevel(#) blength(#) seed(#) nodots
]
lags specifies the lag structure to use for the regressions performed in com-
puting the test statistic. By default, 1 lag is included. Specifying lags(#)
27The procedure we present here differs slightly from that proposed by DH, in the
numbering of the steps, but more importantly also in the definition of the initial conditions
(our step 4), which is not addressed in DH, and the construction of the resampled series
(our step 5). We are indebted to David Ardia (University of Neuchâtel) for his valuable
advice on the bootstrap procedure.
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requests that # lags of the series be used in the regressions. The max-
imum authorized number of lags is such that T > 5 + 3·#. Specifying
lags(aic|bic|hqic [#]) requests that the number of lags of the series
be chosen such that the average Akaike/Bayesian/Hannan-Quinn infor-
mation criterion (AIC/BIC/HQIC) for the set of regressions is minimized.
Regressions with 1 to # lags will be conducted, restricting the number of
observations to T−# for all estimations to make the models nested and
therefore comparable. Displayed statistics come from the set of regres-
sions for which the average AIC/BIC/HQIC is minimized (re-estimated
using the total number of observations available). If # is not specified in
lags(aic|bic|hqic [#]), then it is set to the maximum number of lags
authorized.
regress can be used to display the results of the N individual regressions
on which the test is based. This option is useful to have a look at the
coefficients of individual regressions. When the number of individuals in
the panel is large, this option will result in a very long output.
bootstrap requests p-values and critical values to be computed using a boot-
strap procedure as proposed in section 6.2 of Dumitrescu and Hurlin
(2012). Bootstrap is useful in presence of cross-sectional dependence.
breps indicates the number of bootstrap replications to perform. By default,
it is set to 1000.
blevel indicates the significance level (in %) for computing the bootstrapped
critical values. By default, it is set to 95%.
blength indicates the size of the block length to be used in the bootstrap.
By default, each time period is sampled independently with replacement
(blength(1)). blength(#) allows to implement the bootstrap by divid-
ing the sample into blocks of # time periods and sampling the blocks
independently with replacement. Using blocks of more than one time
period is useful if autocorrelation is suspected.
seed can be used to set the random-number seed. By default, the seed is not
set.
nodots suppresses replication dots. By default, a dot is printed for each
replication to provide an indication of the evolution of the bootstrap.
breps, blevel, blength, seed and nodots are bootstrap suboptions. They
can only be used if bootstrap is also specified.
3.1 Saved results
xtgcause saves the following results in r():
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Scalars
r(wbar) average Wald statistic r(lags) number of lags used for the test
r(zbar) Z-bar statistic r(zbar_pv) p-value of the Z-bar statistic
r(zbart) Z-bar tilde statistic r(zbart_pv) p-value of the Z-bar tilde
statistic
Bootstrap
scalars
r(zbarb_cv) critical value for the Z-bar r(zbartb_cv) critical value for the Z-bar tilde
statistic statistic
r(breps) number of bootstrap r(blevel) significance level for bootstrap
replications critical values
r(blength) size of the block length
Matrices
r(Wi) individual Wald statistics r(PVi) p-values of the individual Wald
statistics
Bootstrap ma-
trices
r(ZBARb) Z-bar statistics from the r(ZBARTb) Z-bar tilde statistics from the
bootstrap procedure bootstrap procedure
4 Examples
Before presenting a couple of examples, we recall that the test implemented in
xtgcause assumes that the variables are stationary. We will not go through
this first step here, but it is the user’s responsibility to check his data sat-
isfy this condition. To this end, the user might consider xtunitroot, which
provides various panel stationarity tests with alternative null hypotheses (in
particular Breitung, 2000; Hadri, 2000; Harris and Tzavalis, 1999; Im et al.,
2003; Levin et al., 2002). The user may also want to perform second gen-
eration panel unit root tests such as the one proposed by Pesaran (2007) to
control for cross-sectional dependence.
4.1 Example based on simulated data
To illustrate the functioning of xtgcause, we first use simulated data pro-
vided by DH at http://www.execandshare.org in the file data-demo.csv.28
We start by importing the original Excel dataset directly from the website.
In the original CSV file, the dataset is organized as a matrix, with all ob-
servations for the each individual in a single cell. Within this cell, the (10)
values of variable x are separated by tabs, a comma separates the last value
of x and the first value of y, and the (10) values of variable y are then sep-
arated by tabs. Hence, the following lines of code allow shaping the data so
as to be understood as a panel by Stata.
. import delimited using "http://www.execandshare.org/execandshare/htdocs/data/M
28Data and MATLAB code are also available at
http://www.runmycode.org/companion/view/42 in a zip file.
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> etaSite/upload/companionSite51/data/data-demo.csv", clear delimiter(",")
> colrange(1:2) varnames(1)
(2 vars, 20 obs)
. qui: split x, parse(`=char(9)´) destring
. qui: split y, parse(`=char(9)´) destring
. drop x y
. gen t = _n
. reshape long x y, i(t) j(id)
(note: j = 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10)
Data wide -> long
Number of obs. 20 -> 200
Number of variables 21 -> 4
j variable (10 values) -> id
xij variables:
x1 x2 ... x10 -> x
y1 y2 ... y10 -> y
. xtset id t
panel variable: id (strongly balanced)
time variable: t, 1 to 20
delta: 1 unit
. l id t x y in 1/5
id t x y
1. 1 1 .55149203 .81872837
2. 1 2 .64373514 -.42077179
3. 1 3 -.58843258 -.40312278
4. 1 4 -.55873336 .14674849
5. 1 5 -.32486386 .42924677
. l id t x y in 21/25
id t x y
21. 2 1 -1.4703536 1.2586422
22. 2 2 1.3356281 -.71173904
23. 2 3 -.21564623 -.73264199
24. 2 4 .08435614 -.67841901
25. 2 5 1.5766581 -.2562083
Some sections of the above piece of code are quite involved, and a few
explanations are in order. We started by importing the data as if values were
separated by commas, which is only partly true. This created two string
variables, named x and y, each containing 10 values (separated by tabs)
in each observation. We then invoked split, using char(9) (which indeed
corresponds to a tab) as the parse string. We used the prefix quietly in
order to avoid a long output indicating that 2 sets of 10 variables (x1, ..., x10,
and y1, ..., y10) were created. These variables were immediately converted
from string to numeric thanks to split’s destring option. In order to have
a well-shaped panel that Stata can correctly interpret, we combined these 2
sets of 10 variables into only 2 variables, which we did using reshape. A few
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observations (the first five for individuals 1 and 2) are displayed to show how
the data is finally organized.
Using the formatted and xtsetted data, we can now run xtgcause. The
simplest possible test in order to investigate whether x causes y would be:
. xtgcause y x
Dumitrescu & Hurlin (2012) Granger non-causality test results:
--------------------------------------------------------------
Lag order: 1
W-bar = 1.2909
Z-bar = 0.6504 (p-value = 0.5155)
Z-bar tilde = 0.2590 (p-value = 0.7956)
--------------------------------------------------------------
H0: x does not Granger-cause y.
H1: x does Granger-cause y for at least one panelvar (id).
Since we did not specify any lag order, xtgcause introduced a single lag
by default. In this case, the outcome of the test does not reject the null
hypothesis. The output reports the values obtained for W (W-bar), Z¯ (Z-
bar), and Z˜ (Z-bar tilde). For the latter two statistics, p-values are provided
based on the standard normal distribution.
One could additionally display the individual Wald statistics and their
corresponding values by displaying the stored matrices r(Wi) and r(PVi)
(which we first combine into a single matrix for the sake of space):
. mat Wi_PVi = r(Wi) , r(PVi)
. mat li Wi_PVi
Wi_PVi[10,2]
Wi PVi
id1 .56655945 .46256089
id2 .11648998 .73731411
id3 .09081952 .76701924
id4 8.1263612 .01156476
id5 .18687517 .67129995
id6 .80060395 .38417583
id7 .53075859 .47681675
id8 .00158371 .96874825
id9 .43635413 .5182858
id10 2.0521113 .17124367
Using the lags() option, we run a similar test introducing 2 lags of the
variables x and y:
. xtgcause y x, lags(2)
Dumitrescu & Hurlin (2012) Granger non-causality test results:
--------------------------------------------------------------
Lag order: 2
W-bar = 1.7302
Z-bar = -0.4266 (p-value = 0.6696)
Z-bar tilde = -0.7052 (p-value = 0.4807)
--------------------------------------------------------------
H0: x does not Granger-cause y.
H1: x does Granger-cause y for at least one panelvar (id).
The conclusion of the test is similar as before.
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Alternatively, the test could also be conducted using a bootstrap proce-
dure to compute p-values and critical values:
. xtgcause y x, bootstrap l(1) breps(100) seed(20171020)
----------------------------
Bootstrap replications (100)
----------------------------
.................................................. 50
.................................................. 100
Dumitrescu & Hurlin (2012) Granger non-causality test results:
--------------------------------------------------------------
Lag order: 1
W-bar = 1.2909
Z-bar = 0.6504 (p-value* = 0.4700, 95% critical value = 1.7316)
Z-bar tilde = 0.2590 (p-value* = 0.7100, 95% critical value = 1.3967)
--------------------------------------------------------------
H0: x does not Granger-cause y.
H1: x does Granger-cause y for at least one panelvar (id).
*p-values computed using 100 bootstrap replications.
In this case, the bootstrapped p-values are relatively close to the asymp-
totic ones displayed in the first test above.
4.2 Example based on real data
In order to provide an example based on real data, we searched for papers
reporting Dumitrescu and Hurlin’s tests and published in journals that make
authors’ datasets available. We found several such papers (e.g., Paramati
et al., 2016, 2017; Salahuddin et al., 2016). In particular, Paramati et al.
(2016) (hereafter PUA) investigate the effect of foreign direct investment
and stock market growth on clean energy use.29 In their Table 8, they report
a series of pairwise panel causality tests between variables such as economic
output, CO2 emissions, or clean energy consumption. As indicated in their
online supplementary data (file Results.xlsx), they conduct the tests using
EViews 8. We replicate some of their results:
. import excel using Data-WDI.xlsx, clear first case(lower) cellrange(A1:I421)
> sheet(FirstDif-Data)
. xtset id year
panel variable: id (strongly balanced)
time variable: year, 1992 to 2012
delta: 1 unit
. xtgcause co2 output, l(2)
Dumitrescu & Hurlin (2012) Granger non-causality test results:
--------------------------------------------------------------
Lag order: 2
W-bar = 2.4223
Z-bar = 0.9442 (p-value = 0.3451)
Z-bar tilde = 0.1441 (p-value = 0.8855)
--------------------------------------------------------------
H0: output does not Granger-cause co2.
29See http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0140988316300214.
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H1: output does Granger-cause co2 for at least one panelvar (id).
. xtgcause fdi output, l(2)
Dumitrescu & Hurlin (2012) Granger non-causality test results:
--------------------------------------------------------------
Lag order: 2
W-bar = 4.6432
Z-bar = 5.9103 (p-value = 0.0000)
Z-bar tilde = 3.7416 (p-value = 0.0002)
--------------------------------------------------------------
H0: output does not Granger-cause fdi.
H1: output does Granger-cause fdi for at least one panelvar (id).
The first line of the above code imports the dataset constructed by PUA
(file Data-WDI.xlsx, sheet “FirstDif-Data”). We then use xtgcause to test
for the causality from output to co2 and from output to fdi, which correspond
to some tests reported in PUA’s Table 8. We use 2 lags in both cases to
match the numbers indicated by PUA in their accompanying appendix file.
Comparing with PUA’s output, it turns out that the denomination “Zbar-
Stat” used in EViews corresponds to the Z-bar tilde statistic (while the Z-bar
statistic is not provided).
Optionally, xtgcause allows the user to request the lag order to be cho-
sen so that the Akaike, Bayesian, or Hannan-Quinn information criteria be
minimized. Given that DH offer no guidance regarding the choice of the lag
order, this feature might be appealing to practitioners. We can for instance
test the causality from output to fdi specifying the option lags(bic):
. xtgcause fdi output, l(bic)
Dumitrescu & Hurlin (2012) Granger non-causality test results:
--------------------------------------------------------------
Optimal number of lags (BIC): 1 (lags tested: 1 to 5).
W-bar = 1.3027
Z-bar = 0.9572 (p-value = 0.3385)
Z-bar tilde = 0.4260 (p-value = 0.6701)
--------------------------------------------------------------
H0: output does not Granger-cause fdi.
H1: output does Granger-cause fdi for at least one panelvar (id).
In practice, xtgcause runs all sets of regressions with a lag order from
1 to the highest possible number (i.e., such that T > 5 + 3K or optionally
specified by the user below this limit), maintaining a common sample. Said
otherwise, if at most 5 lags are to be considered, the first 5 observations of
the panel will never be considered in the estimations, even if it would be
possible to do so with fewer than 5 lags. This is required in order to have
nested models, which can then be appropriately compared using AIC, BIC, or
HQIC. After this series of estimations, xtgcause selects the optimal outcome
(i.e., such that the average AIC/BIC/HQIC of the N individual estimations
is the lowest) and re-runs all estimations with the optimal number of lags
and using the maximal number of observations available. Statistics based on
the latter are reported as output.
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In the above example, the optimal lag order using BIC appears to be 1,
which is different from the lag order selected by PUA for this test.30 Worry-
ingly, this difference is not without consequences, since the conclusion of the
test in this case is reversed. More precisely, the null hypothesis is not rejected
with the optimally-selected single lag, but PUA use 2 lags and therefore re-
ject the null hypothesis. Considering that empirical research in economics is
used to formulate policy recommendations, such inaccurate conclusions may
potentially be harmful. We therefore consider xtgcause’s option allowing
to select the number of lags based on AIC/BIC/HQIC as an important im-
provement. It will allow researchers to rely on these widely accepted criteria
and make the selection in a transparent way.
Finally, xtgcause makes it possible to compute the p-values and critical
values associated with the Z-bar and Z-bar tilde via a bootstrap procedure.
Computing bootstrapped critical values (rather than asymptotic ones) may
be useful in presence of cross-sectional dependence. Extending our example
based on PUA data, we test the causality from output to fdi by adding the
bootstrap option (we also use seed for replicability reasons and nodots for
the sake of space):
. xtgcause fdi output, l(bic) bootstrap seed(20171020) nodots
-----------------------------
Bootstrap replications (1000)
-----------------------------
Dumitrescu & Hurlin (2012) Granger non-causality test results:
--------------------------------------------------------------
Optimal number of lags (BIC): 1 (lags tested: 1 to 5).
W-bar = 1.3027
Z-bar = 0.9572 (p-value* = 0.4530, 95% critical value = 3.0746)
Z-bar tilde = 0.4260 (p-value* = 0.7080, 95% critical value = 2.1234)
--------------------------------------------------------------
H0: output does not Granger-cause fdi.
H1: output does Granger-cause fdi for at least one panelvar (id).
*p-values computed using 1000 bootstrap replications.
What xtgcause does in this case is first to compute the Z-bar and Z-
bar tilde statistics using the optimal number of lags as in previous series
of estimations, and it then computes the bootstrapped p-values and critical
values. By default, 1,000 bootstrap replications are performed. We observe
that the bootstrapped p-value for the Z-bar increases substantially compared
to the asymptotic p-value obtained before (from 0.34 to 0.45), while that for
the Z-bar tilde remains closer. This should be interpreted as a signal that the
estimations suffer from small sample biases, so that asymptotic p-values are
under-estimated. Bootstrapped p-values indicate that the null hypothesis
30The number of lags would be 3 using HQIC and 4 using AIC. Therefore, while PUA
state in their Table 8 that “the appropriate lag length is chosen based on SIC”, we do not
find the same number with any of the information criterion considered.
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is far from being rejected, strengthening our above concerns about PUA
conclusions based on the asymptotic p-values and obtained with 2 lags.
5 Conclusion
This paper has presented the user-written command xtgcause, which auto-
mates a procedure introduced by Dumitrescu and Hurlin (2012) in order to
detect Granger causality in panel datasets. In this branch of econometrics,
the empirical literature appears to be lagging, with the latest theoretical de-
velopments being not always available in statistical packages. One important
contribution of our command is to allow the user to select the number of lags
based on the Akaike, the Bayesian, or the Hannan-Quinn information crite-
rion. This choice may have an impact on the conclusion of the test, but some
researchers may have overlooked it. As a consequence, several empirical pa-
pers might have reached erroneous conclusions. Another useful contribution
of xtgcause is that it allows to calculate bootstrapped critical values, a very
useful option in presence of cross-sectional dependence. With this command
and this article, we therefore hope to bring some useful clarifications and
help practitioners conduct sound research.
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Chapter 3: Causal Links
Between Bilateral Official
Development Assistance and
Exports: The Swiss Case§
1 Introduction
An important feature of today’s economy is that nations increasingly trade
with each other. Economically, this is a blessing as Ricardo’s theory of
comparative advantage proved two centuries ago: trade has the potential
to make everyone better-off. It is precisely to promote trade that the OECD
put in place in 1961 a committee in charge of encouraging wealthy nations
to assist developing countries. This assistance is nowadays commonly known
as the “Official Development Assistance” (ODA) (also called aid).
Even if a purely altruistic behavior cannot be excluded (see for instance
Berthélemy, 2006), donor countries may have different reasons to donate to a
particular country. For instance, a hidden rationale, or at least not publicly
admitted, to favor a country can be the current trade situation. It is indeed
possible and understandable that donor countries will likely consider impor-
tant trading partners first when allocating aid. We may thus expect causal
links from exports to aid. On the other hand, causality from aid to exports
can also be expected due to, for instance, the creation of a longstanding re-
lationship, referred to as “goodwill” in the literature (see for instance Arvin
et al., 2000; Wagner, 2003; Martínez-Zarzoso et al., 2009) between the donor
and the recipient country. The goodwill effect can be simplistically viewed
as the fact that if you help someone one day, they may reciprocate in time.
In the present topic the goodwill effect is built through ODA contributions.
Using a model that considers tied and untied aid simultaneously, Arvin and
Baum (1997) identified the optimal paths of both types of aid in order to
maximize the goodwill and concluded that the two kinds of aid foster the
so-called goodwill. In their contribution Martínez-Zarzoso et al. (2009) also
point out two other reasons why giving aid may affect the donor exports,
namely tied aid and habit-formation. The tied aid effect is basically the fact
§This paper was presented at the International Panel Data Conference (IPDC), Thes-
saloniki (Greece), July 2017; at a Trent University seminar, Peterborough (Canada), April
2018; and at the annual Congress of the Swiss Society of Economics and Statistics, St-
Gallen (Switzerland), June 2018.
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that the donor’s aid is restricted to the procurement of goods and services
from the donor. Then, habit-formation is, in a sense, the continuity of the
direct impact of tied aid.31 Indeed, having sent your own goods may create
a dependence/familiarity with those goods (see Djajić et al. (2004) for more
details on habit-formation).
Switzerland is a very interesting country to analyze in this respect be-
cause the tied aid effect, and consequently but, to a lesser extent the habit-
formation effect, are likely to be weak since this country is considered as one
of the most altruistic donor countries due to the high share of untied aid
it provides. For instance Berthélemy (2006) categorizes 19 donor countries
according to their aid providers’ behavior, i.e., altruistic, average or egoistic
and Switzerland is found by the author to be the most altruistic country.
In addition, in the report by Clay et al. (2009), undertaken under the aus-
pices of the Secretariat for the Evaluation of the Paris Declaration and the
OECD/DAC, Switzerland is classified as a highly altruistic country with an
untied aid ratio of 98.4% in 2007.32 It is worth noting that this ratio was
already of 84% (on average) for the period 1979-2016 and of 96% for the pe-
riod 2000-2016 (OECD database). To summarize, out of the three economic
explanations on why aid may create exports for the donor country, the most
valid in the Swiss case is apparently the “goodwill” effect. Thus, the fact
that we will focus on Switzerland in the present study is particularly path-
breaking since we are analyzing the statistical link between aid and exports
(and conversely) for a country with a very high proportion of untied aid.
Studies that test for any kind of causality between aid and exports and
that focus on one donor country as we do, are rather scarce. To our knowl-
edge, the only such papers are Arvin and Choudhry (1997) who focus on
Canada as aid provider, Arvin et al. (2003) who use Italy as donor country,
Arvin et al. (2000) who analyze Germany and Lloyd et al. (2000) who use
France, Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom as donor coun-
tries. All studies use the method developed by Granger (1969) to test for
causality. The conclusion reached by Arvin and Choudhry (1997) and Arvin
et al. (2000) is that causal relations are not all of one type and highly depend
on the set of recipients analyzed (grouped by region, income and existing ties
with Canada, respectively Germany). In the same vein, Arvin et al. (2003)
found that causality (unilateral or bilateral) between Italian aid and exports
exists only towards some recipient countries. Lloyd et al.’s (2000) conclusion
is less nuanced: a statistical link between aid and trade is an exception rather
31In fact, untied aid can also be the in form of the donor’s goods and services (winning
a tendering process, desired by the recipient country, etc.). Thus, untied aid may also set
up the habit-formation effect.
32See Clay et al. (2009) Table 3.3 (page 12) for details on the untied aid ratio.
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than the norm. The present study differs in two major ways: 1) it focuses on
a country considered as highly altruistic in its way of allocating aid, namely
Switzerland, 2) it uses current econometric tools to test for causality in an
heterogeneous panel data set. To do so, four different unit root tests and the
Dumitrescu-Hurlin Granger non-causality test are employed.
In the present study we will test for causality in both directions, that
is exports towards aid and aid towards exports. It is however the existence
of the latter relation that may interest the most Swiss supporters of official
development assistance. If causality is found, it will give them a strong
argument to ask for an increase of the total amount of aid (or at least not cut
current amounts). On the other hand, if there is no evidence of causality from
aid towards exports, it will allow them to claim Switzerland is so altruistic
that the aid the country allocates is not meant to influence its trade.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses some
literature on ODA and Granger causality tests. Section 3 presents the data
used in the present study and describes the different groups of countries
created. Section 4 details the panel unit root tests used (4.1) as well as the
Granger causality test employed (4.2). Section 5 presents the results of all
tests. Section 6 discusses some important issues and gives some limitations
of the present study. Section 7 concludes and provides policy implications.
2 Literature review
ODA has been the subject of numerous studies, dealing with various issues.
A large body of literature focuses on recipient countries and is concerned
with the degree of efficiency of such aid on their growth rate (see for instance
Burnside and Dollar, 2000; Easterly, 2003) or on their trade capacity (see for
instance Nowak-Lehmann et al., 2013). A striking feature of this literature
is that results do not provide clear-cut evidence on the effective impact of
ODA on recipient countries’ growth or trade.
Then, some authors have started to look at the effects of aid on the donor
countries. Among them stand the ones measuring the impact of aid on the
donor country through trade (see the book of Arvin and Lew (2015) on the
economics of foreign aid for a thorough overview in this topic). McCallum
(1995) and Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), have shown in their contri-
butions that a good way to adequately compute aid’s impact on trade is by
using a modified/augmented trade gravity model. Since 2003, several authors
have tried to measure the impact of ODA on the donor country’s exports,
all convinced that aid creates a “goodwill” which then becomes source of fu-
ture partnerships. Moreover, using Canadian data, Arvin et al. (1996) found
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evidence that untied aid produces a lingering effect on exports in the same
way an advertisement does on sales. We believe these lingering and/or good-
will effects constitute the foundation for a possible statistical link between
ODA and exports. Each contribution aiming at computing the impact of
aid on trade is of course unique due to its specific assumptions or methods
but nearly all conclude that there is indeed a positive relationship between
aid and exports in the donor country (see for instance recently Helble et al.
(2012); Silva and Nelson (2012); Pettersson and Johansson (2013); Hühne
et al. (2014) or Wagner (2003), one of the first to use a gravity model in this
framework). These studies use databases with many donor countries and
several recipient countries.
Studies analyzing thoroughly a single country (at least the ones using
a gravity model) are scarce. We can still mention Martínez-Zarzoso et al.
(2009), Nowak-Lehmann et al. (2009), Martínez-Zarzoso et al. (2010) or
Martínez-Zarzoso et al. (2013) looking in detail at the German case or Skär-
vall (2012) looking at the Swedish case. For a good overview of studies
employing a gravity model (single or multiple donor approach) see Martínez-
Zarzoso (2015). The present study does not aim at quantifying the impact of
ODA on trade (exports) but at determining the direction of Granger causal-
ity, if Granger causality there is, between ODA and exports within a hetero-
geneous panel data set (see Arvin et al., 2003, for a similar approach in a
time series framework).
Granger causality between two series is an old issue in time series litera-
ture but a relatively recent topic in terms of panel data. Indeed, there is a
growing availability of panel databases with not only a large number of indi-
viduals N but also a large number of time periods T . This shift from micro
to macro panels implies that classical issues from time series extend to panel
data, such as spurious regressions due to unit roots, but also consequently
implies that time series techniques, such as Granger causality, can now also
be used in panel data. The term “Granger causality” refers to a specific form
of causality (temporal sense) that has been developed by Granger (1969,
1980) and that differs from the usual definition of causality. Indeed, Granger
causality tests do not evaluate cause-and-effect relationships between two
variables but look for a statistical relationship instead. In a nutshell Granger
causality exists if a variable has a predictive capability on another variable.
Although nearly half a century old, the model and the technique proposed
by Granger are still currently used in many studies, the present one being
one of them. The main difference between employing Granger causality tests
in a times series framework or in a panel one is that with panels there are as
many coefficients as individuals N in the data set. Therefore, the different
models adapting Granger causality to panel data will basically differ in the
60
way they treat and test the individuals coefficients.
One of the first studies in such framework is the one by Holtz-Eakin et al.
(1988). The authors first-difference their data in order to eliminate fixed
effects and then, estimate the model by applying instrumental variables.
Their model assumes a common coefficient on the independent variable for
all individuals. To relax this strong assumption, Nair-Reichert and Weinhold
(2001) have used Mixed Fixed and Random (MFR) models as first proposed
by Hsiao et al. (1989) and then adapted to the present panel data framework
by Weinhold (1996). A closely related approach is the one by Kónya (2006),
who uses seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) systems and Wald tests with
country specific bootstrapped critical values. Finally, in the same kind of
framework but with a slightly different approach, Dumitrescu and Hurlin
(2012) propose to test for Granger non-causality based on an averaged across
individuals Wald statistic. This is the strategy we follow in this paper.
3 Data
The two variables of interest in the present study are Swiss bilateral ODA33
and Swiss exports (annual data). Regarding Swiss bilateral ODA in Swiss
francs (CHF)34, data are available on the “Federal Department of Foreign
Affairs” website under the “ Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation
(SDC)” section. In the present study we will use Swiss bilateral ODA from
1974 to 2016 directed towards a total of 50 recipient countries.35 Concern-
ing Swiss exports towards the same 50 ODA recipient countries and for the
same period, data are collected on the UN Comtrade database. All data (in
absolute and nominal terms) are directly available or converted into USD
using annualized exchange rates from the OECD database. All the tests and
regressions are done using the logarithms (natural) of our series. The loga-
33Bilateral ODA is ODA that is directly donated to a country. Multilateral ODA is
ODA that is donated to international organizations that are active in several least devel-
oped countries. In our study only bilateral ODA is considered since data on multilateral
ODA are difficult, if not impossible, to correctly spread across recipient countries. To-
gether, bilateral ODA and multilateral ODA sum up to the so-called “official development
assistance” to poorer countries.
34In 2016, 1 USD was equivalent to 0.985 CHF according to the OECD statistics web-
site.
35Data on Swiss bilateral ODA on the SDC website is available from 1960 to 2017 and
towards 105 recipient countries but with an important number of missing values. Since
some econometric tests used in this study require a balanced panel data set, only 50
countries are kept over 43 years (1974 to 2016). As mentioned, 2017 ODA figures are also
available but provisional (and with unreported values for some recipients) and therefore
not considered for the analysis.
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rithmic transformation allows to normalize the data - a common procedure
in particular when using macroeconomic series that are more disposed to be
skewed.
The nature of the relationship between ODA and exports might differ
across recipient countries. In order to investigate this issue, we will evaluate
the causality between our series for various groups of countries. We will
first consider geographical regions with the “African”, “Latin American” and
“Asian” group of countries. Then, to capture level effects, we create the
“high” and the “low” exports group of countries. In the former group stand
the countries with which Switzerland trades more (i.e. above the entire period
median) and in the latter group stand the countries with which Switzerland
trades less. Exactly the same procedure is used to create the two last group
of countries, i.e. the “high” and the “low” bilateral aid groups. Appendix A
enumerates the 50 countries kept and shows their classification into specific
group of countries.
4 Tests
Non-stationarity is a well-known potential issue in time-series, and it could
also arise in long panel datasets. Therefore, a necessary first step before
testing causality is to test for the presence of unit roots. If the series contain
unit roots, the issue of spurious regression arises and one has to employ
cointegration and error correction techniques in order to ensure the correct
identification of causal relationships. On the contrary, if the series follow a
stationary process, then causality tests as developed by Granger (1969, 1980)
are valid to detect the presence and the direction of a statistical link.
4.1 Unit root tests
Several panel unit root tests have been developed in the literature and this
study will apply some of them.36 Four different tests are applied, the HT test
(Harris and Tzavalis, 1999), the LLC test (Levin et al., 2002), the IPS test
(Im et al., 2003) and the PESCADF test (Pesaran, 2007). A brief description
of the four unit root tests follows below.
A general autoregressive panel equation serves as a basis to all tests:
∆yit = βyi,t−1 + αmidmt + µit i = 1, ..., N ; t = 1, ..., T ; m = 1, 2, 3 (1)
36As additional well-known panel unit root tests (not employed in this contribution),
we can mention, for instance, the Fisher-Type tests: Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) and
Phillips-Perron (PP) tests discussed by Maddala and Wu (1999) and Choi (2001).
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where dmt allows to implement different specifications, with d1t = ∅ (empty
set) which implies that there is no fixed effect and therefore a homogeneous
panel is assumed, d2t = {1} which includes individual fixed effects and there-
fore allows for heterogeneity across individuals of the panel, and d3t = {1, t}
which includes individual fixed effects as well as an individual time trend.
Although every test relies on the above general equation, they still differ
for instance, depending on the method used to estimate the coefficients,
on the test statistic, on the assumption regarding the disturbances (µit),
i.e. cross-sectional dependence versus cross-sectional independence37 or, on
the definition of the coefficient β, i.e. whether it is homogeneous across all
individuals in the panel or not.
For instance, in their paper, Harris and Tzavalis (1999) test for unit roots
based on the normalized pooled least squares estimator of the autoregressive
coefficient (that is corrected depending on the model used) coming from the
pooled regression. They assume a fixed time dimension (T ). The models they
use are the ones from equation (1). The assumptions made by Harris and
Tzavalis (1999) imply cross-sectional independence by design. The authors
argue that one option to relax, or at least mitigate this assumption, is by
subtracting the cross-section mean from the data. Their assumptions also
imply serially uncorrelated errors.
Levin et al. (2002) propose a unit root test based on the t statistic (and
not on the estimator itself as in Harris and Tzavalis (1999)) obtained from a
pooled regression. Although the authors assume that all individuals in the
panel have identical first-order partial correlation (i.e. β and not βi), the
test is based on the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) method.38 The authors
point as an important limit of their test the requirement of cross-sectional in-
dependence and add that sometimes subtracting the cross-sectional averages
is not sufficient to remove contemporaneous correlation. By construction the
authors’ assumptions allow for serial correlation.
Im et al. (2003) propose a different approach to test for unit roots in the
sense that they use a t-statistic based on ADF statistics averaged across indi-
viduals. Their test allows for serial correlation when T and N are sufficiently
large. In addition to the change in the method used, the other observable
dissimilarity between the HT and LLC procedures and the one proposed by
Im et al. (2003) is that the first-order autoregressive parameter βi can differ
across countries in the latter, which implies that the interpretation of the
alternative hypothesis differs substantially. Indeed, in Im et al. (2003) if the
37Serial correlation can also be an issue in panel data, but all tests except Harris and
Tzavalis (1999) allow for serial correlation. We will therefore not further discuss this issue.
38See the proposed three-step procedure in section 2.2 of Levin et al. (2002) for more
details.
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null is rejected it is stated that some panels are stationary (not necessarily
all but at least one)39 whereas in Harris and Tzavalis (1999) and Levin et al.
(2002) if the null is rejected it is stated that all individuals in the panel are
stationary. As in HT and LLC, the IPS test does not deal with cross-sectional
dependence but again, subtracting the cross-sectional averages may mitigate
this issue.
Finally, Pesaran (2007) proposes a unit root test that allows for cross-
sectional dependence and serial correlation. To do so he uses an extended ver-
sion of the standard augmented Dickey-Fuller regression. Concretely, stan-
dard ADF regressions for the individuals series are augmented with current
and lagged cross-section averages of all the series in the panel. As in Im et al.
(2003), the alternative hypothesis has to be cautiously interpreted when the
null is rejected.
4.2 Dumitrescu-Hurlin Granger non-causality test
This study uses the Dumitrescu-Hurlin Granger non-causality test recently
developed by Dumitrescu and Hurlin (2012), which is a modified version of
the well-known Granger test. The simple model developed by Granger (1969)
with two series (that have to be stationary) is given by:
Xt =
m∑
j=1
ajXt−j +
m∑
j=1
bjYt−j + t
Yt =
m∑
j=1
cjYt−j +
m∑
j=1
djXt−j + ηt
where t and ηt are two uncorrelated white-noise series. If some bj or cj are
not zero, then Yt is causing Xt or Xt is causing Yt respectively. The two
causal relationships are not mutually exclusive.
As we will do below for the Dumitrescu-Hurlin model, Hsiao (1979, 1981,
1982) has proposed an augmented version of the above Granger causality
test by allowing different lag length for each series and where the latter are
chosen to minimize the Akaike (1969, 1970) final prediction error. The Hsiao
version of the Granger causality test is thus based on the following equations:
Xt =
m∑
j=1
ajXt−j +
n∑
j=1
bjYt−j + t
39According to the authors, it is not possible to identify the exact proportion of sta-
tionary individuals.
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Yt =
o∑
j=1
cjXt−j +
p∑
j=1
djYt−j + ηt
Dumitrescu and Hurlin (2012) have proposed a modified version of the
Granger causality test in order to use it in heterogeneous panel datasets. As
in Granger (1969) the test requires two stationary series and the model is
given by:
yi,t = αi +
K∑
k=1
γ
(k)
i yi,t−k +
K∑
k=1
β
(k)
i xi,t−k + i,t (2)
with K ∈ N ? and βi = (β(1)i , ..., β(k)i )′. The lag order K is identical for
all individuals in the panel. The authors do not discuss in their paper the
optimal lag length to include in the model. The autoregressive parameters
γ
(k)
i and the coefficients β
(k)
i can differ across individuals but are constant in
time. The null and the alternative hypotheses associated with the model are
given by:
H0: βi = 0 ∀i = 1, ..., N (non causality in all panels)
Ha =
βi = 0 ∀i = 1, ..., N1βi 6= 0 ∀i = N1 + 1, N1 + 2, ..., N causality in some panels
where N1 is unknown but satisfies the condition 0 ≤ N1 < N . This structure
is similar to the one proposed by Im et al. (2003) and Pesaran (2007) discussed
above.40
Dumitrescu and Hurlin (2012) propose to associate the Wald statistics
averaged across individuals to the test of the non causality hypothesis for
individuals i = 1, ..., N :
WN,T =
1
N
N∑
i=1
Wi,T
whereWi,T is the standard adjusted Wald statistic for individual i calculated
over T periods.41 Although the individual Wald statistics converge to a
chi-squared distribution with K degrees of freedom42 (where K stands for
the number of lags), the authors show that the distribution of the average
Wald statistic when T → ∞ first and then N → ∞, can be deduced from
40The alternative has to be read as follows: if we have 50 (= N) recipient countries in
our panel, and 20 (= N1) do not show causal link (βi = 0), then 30 (= N −N1) do show
causal link (βi 6= 0).
41See Dumitrescu and Hurlin (2012) page 1453 for the exact mathematical definition
of Wi,T .
42Wi,T
d−−−−→
T→∞
χ2(K),∀i = 1, ..., N .
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a standard Lindberg-Levy central limit theorem and thus infer that WN,T
sequentially converges in distribution in the following way:
ZN,T =
√
N
2K (WN,T −K)
d−−−−−→
T,N→∞
N (0, 1) (3)
In addition to this Z-statistic, Dumitrescu and Hurlin (2012) also propose
the Z˜-statistic allowing for a fixed T dimension (under the assumption of
T > 5 + 2K). Their standardized average Z˜ is given by:
Z˜N =
√√√√ N
2K
(T − 2K − 5)
(T −K − 3)
(T − 2K − 3)
(T − 2K − 1)WN,T −K
 d−−−→
N→∞
N(0, 1) (4)
This latter statistic, i.e. Z˜N , has been closely examined by Dumitrescu and
Hurlin by running Monte-Carlo simulations. Their conclusion is that Z˜N has
the desired properties even with small T and N . They also show that their
standardized panel statistics have good small sample properties even in the
presence of cross-sectional dependence.
Finally, it is important noting that in such autoregressive models the op-
timal number of lags to include is often an issue. In the present study, we
propose to select the optimal number of lags so as to minimize the Akaike
Information Criteria (AIC) as in Hsiao (1979, 1981, 1982) or, the Hannan-
Quinn Information Criteria (HQIC) or alternatively, the Bayesian Informa-
tion Criteria (BIC). To do so model (2) is run using a Stata routine developed
by Lopez and Weber (2017). As the authors explain in their contribution, if
for instance the AIC is used, what is done is that all sets of regressions con-
taining a lag order from 1 to the upper limit number of lags (see Lopez and
Weber (2017) or Dumitrescu and Hurlin (2012) for more information on the
upper limit number of lags) are run keeping the number of observations in
all estimations constant. In other words, if the upper limit number of lags is
5, the first 5 observations of the panel will never be considered in the estima-
tions. After this series of estimations, the “best” model is selected (that is,
the one that minimizes say the average AIC of the N individual estimations).
The results of both the unit root tests and the Dumitrescu-Hurlin Granger
non-causality tests are presented below in, respectively, subsections 5.1 and
5.2.
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5 Results
5.1 Unit root
The motivation for selecting the four tests discussed above is that they cover
two major panel data issues. Indeed, whereas one test (HT) assumes serial
uncorrelated errors, the others allow for serial correlation (LLC, IPS and
PESCADF). Most tests assume cross-sectional independence although this
issue can be mitigated (HT, LLC and IPS) but one allows for cross-sectional
dependence (PESCADF).
Concerning the optimal lag length to include in the tests, it is based on
the Akaike Information Criteria (AIC) for the LLC and IPS tests (with a
restriction of a maximum of five lags in order to keep sufficient degrees of
freedom). In the PESCADF test, one lag is included. Finally, in the HT
test, no lags are included.
With regard to the models, only the model specifications 2 and 3 pre-
sented in equation (1) are run. Indeed, model specification 1 assumes homo-
geneity of the panel, an assumption that does not hold in this study given
the nature of our data. Then, as a second step, the HT, LLC and IPS tests
are run with the option of subtracting the cross-sectional mean to mitigate
eventual cross-sectional dependence.
Furthermore, we sequentially apply these tests to ODA and exports first
to the full panel of 50 countries, then to the “African”, “Asian” and “Latin
American” groups of countries, finally to the so-called “high” and “low” ex-
ports and aid countries respectively.
Results are reported in tables 1 to 8 and are rather unambiguous. All
series seem to follow a stationary process. There is no model, regardless of
the set of countries considered, where all tests show unit root process. De-
meaning does not seem to bring much information which is an indication
that cross-sectional dependence is not a serious issue in our data. This con-
clusion is reinforced by the fact that the results of the PESCADF test, that
allows for cross sectional dependence, are not different from the other tests’
results. These results which point towards stationarity of our series allow
us to confidently run Dumitrescu-Hurlin Granger causality test in the next
section.
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Table 1: Panel unit root tests
Variable Test I I + T I + T + D
stat lags stat lags stat lags
AID HT .543*** - .318*** - .275*** -
LLC −7.681*** 1.64 −7.102*** 1.4 −8.831*** 1.3
IPS −6.655*** 1.64 −8.364*** 1.4 −11.623*** 1.3
PESCADF −2.672*** 1 −3.126*** 1 - -
EXP HT .865*** - .618*** - .559*** -
LLC −4.024*** 1.04 −5.362*** 1.1 −7.023*** 1.22
IPS −1.747** 1.04 −6.822*** 1.1 −9.287*** 1.22
PESCADF −2.563*** 1 −3.086*** 1 - -
Note: *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. I = Intercept, T = Trend, D = Demean.
Table 2: Panel unit root tests “Africa”
Variable Test I I + T I + T + D
stat lags stat lags stat lags
AID HT .566*** - .298*** - .183*** -
LLC −6.864*** 1.81 −6.378*** 1.54 −9.46*** 1.04
IPS −5.632*** 1.81 −5.856*** 1.54 −9.73*** 1.04
PESCADF −2.592*** 1 −3.236*** 1 - -
EXP HT .766*** - .607*** - .509*** -
LLC −3.704*** 1 −2.997*** 1.08 −7.662*** .5
IPS −3.447*** 1 −4.734*** 1.08 −9.381*** .5
PESCADF −2.685*** 1 −3.431*** 1 - -
Note: *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. I = Intercept, T = Trend, D = Demean.
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Table 3: Panel unit root tests “Asia”
Variable Test I I + T I + T + D
stat lags stat lags stat lags
AID HT .602*** - .463*** - .463*** -
LLC −4.267*** 1.55 −4.421*** 1.36 −6.38*** .91
IPS −3.373*** 1.55 −5.665*** 1.36 −6.22*** .91
PESCADF −2.955*** 1 −3.138*** 1 - -
EXP HT .954 - .635*** - .624*** -
LLC −1.506* 1.55 −2.552*** 1.45 −2.931*** 1.73
IPS 1.657 1.55 −3.543*** 1.45 −3.06*** 1.73
PESCADF −2.323** 1 −2.594 1 - -
Note: *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. I = Intercept, T = Trend, D = Demean.
Table 4: Panel unit root tests “Latin America”
Variable Test I I + T I + T + D
stat lags stat lags stat lags
AID HT .754*** - .666*** - .634*** -
LLC −1.924** 1.33 −.816 1.08 −.165 1
IPS −2.07** 1.33 −2.945*** 1.08 −3.399*** 1
PESCADF −1.795 1 −2.498 1 - -
EXP HT .866*** - .65*** - .613*** -
LLC −1.723** .58 −3.538*** .92 −3.085*** 1
IPS −.248 .58 −2.888*** .92 −2.133** 1
PESCADF −2.284** 1 −2.893** 1 - -
Note: *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. I = Intercept, T = Trend, D = Demean.
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Table 5: Panel unit root tests “High aid”
Variable Test I I + T I + T + D
stat lags stat lags stat lags
AID HT .751*** - .624*** - .585*** -
LLC −6.276*** 2.04 −4.467*** 1.92 −6.638*** 1.12
IPS −5.509*** 2.04 −6.508*** 1.92 −8.639*** 1.12
PESCADF −2.594*** 1 −3.197*** 1 - -
EXP HT .871*** - .61*** - .553*** -
LLC −2.153** 1.31 −2.475*** 1.31 −5.61*** .96
IPS .059 1.31 −3.813*** 1.31 −7.801*** .96
PESCADF −2.829*** 1 −3.335*** 1 - -
Note: *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. I = Intercept, T = Trend, D = Demean. This group of
countries includes recipients to which Switzerland has provided ODA above the median (based on
the whole period).
Table 6: Panel unit root tests “Low aid”
Variable Test I I + T I + T + D
stat lags stat lags stat lags
AID HT .406*** - .156*** - .132*** -
LLC −4.52*** 1.21 −5.88*** .83 −9.058*** .83
IPS −3.863*** 1.21 −5.29*** .83 −9.226*** .83
PESCADF −2.607*** 1 −3.037*** 1 - -
EXP HT .855*** - .629*** - .569*** -
LLC −3.472*** .75 −5.157*** .88 −5.25*** .54
IPS −2.595*** .75 −5.886*** .88 −5.686*** .54
PESCADF −2.18** 1 −2.812*** 1 - -
Note: *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. I = Intercept, T = Trend, D = Demean. This group of
countries includes recipients to which Switzerland has provided ODA below the median (based on
the whole period).
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Table 7: Panel unit root tests “High exports”
Variable Test I I + T I + T + D
stat lags stat lags stat lags
AID HT .47*** - .218*** - .188*** -
LLC −4.362*** 1.5 −5.095*** 1.21 −7.044*** 1.38
IPS −3.168*** 1.5 −5.648*** 1.21 −8.629*** 1.38
PESCADF −2.637*** 1 −2.991*** 1 - -
EXP HT .954 - .692*** - .675*** -
LLC −2.72*** 1.13 −4.547*** 1.04 −5.015*** 1.33
IPS 1.317 1.13 −6.168*** 1.04 −5.762*** 1.33
PESCADF −2.5*** 1 −2.879*** 1 - -
Note: *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. I = Intercept, T = Trend, D = Demean. This group
of countries includes recipients to which Switzerland has exported above the median (based on the
whole period).
Table 8: Panel unit root tests “Low exports”
Variable Test I I + T I + T + D
stat lags stat lags stat lags
AID HT .637*** - .459*** - .372*** -
LLC −6.354*** 1.77 −5.015*** 1.58 −8.629*** 1.23
IPS −6.179*** 1.77 −6.171*** 1.58 −11.276*** 1.23
PESCADF −2.595*** 1 −3.225*** 1 - -
EXP HT .741*** - .591*** - .503*** -
LLC −3.775*** .96 −2.928*** 1.15 −7.612*** .81
IPS −3.693*** .96 −3.538*** 1.15 −9.705*** .81
PESCADF −2.728*** 1 −3.521*** 1 - -
Note: *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. I = Intercept, T = Trend, D = Demean. This group
of countries includes recipients to which Switzerland has exported below the median (based on the
whole period).
5.2 Dumitrescu-Hurlin Granger non-causality
The Dumitrescu-Hurlin Granger non-causality test explained above (see sec-
tion 4.2) is run on each of the eight group of countries described earlier and
in both directions, i.e. from exports towards ODA and from ODA towards
exports. This gives us 16 different models. The expected results are not obvi-
ous since one may expect causality running from ODA to exports due to the
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creation of a longstanding relationship (“goodwill”) between the donor and
the recipient countries but, on the other hand, one may also expect causal-
ity from exports to ODA since donor countries may consider trade when
allocating the total amount of ODA to be distributed.
Again, Dumitrescu and Hurlin (2012) propose two different statistics in
their paper, i.e. ZN,T (see equation (3)) and Z˜N (see equation (4)) depending
on the size of T as explained earlier. Since in our case T is equal to 43, it is
not clear what statistic should be used. Indeed, even if it is far from infinity,
a T equal to 43 is sufficiently large according to table 1 in Dumitrescu and
Hurlin (2012) to have a powerful panel Granger (non-)causality test. In this
context, we have decided to compute both statistics.
Table 9 shows the results of the Dumitrescu-Hurlin Granger non-causality
test with one lag. Including one lag means that the test is based on the
individual averaged Wald statistics from the model: yi,t = αi + γiyi,t−1 +
βixi,t−1 + i,t. The results are unambiguous (and similar whether we look
at ZN,T or Z˜N). Granger causality seems to run from exports to ODA as
well as from ODA to exports and for all countries. The only potential doubt
of Granger causality is regarding the African countries and from ODA to
exports. Indeed, according to the ZN,T statistic Granger causality is present,
whereas in accordance to the Z˜N statistic, there is no Granger causality.
When the assumption on the number of lags is either by minimizing the
Akaike, the Hannan-Quinn or the Bayesian information criteria, conclusions
remain relatively unaltered despite the slight changes in ZN,T and Z˜N (see
tables 10, 11 and 12)43. As for the unit root tests, we have set a maximum
number of lags equal to 5 to avoid losing too many degrees of freedom.
To summarize, results show that causality is bidirectional (also called
feedback). On the one hand, some amount of ODA may thus have been
allocated on the basis of existing trade relationships. On the other hand,
exports to a given country may have occurred thanks to the existence of
“goodwill” created by past and current flows of ODA.
43The optimal number of lags obtained when applying the BIC criterion is 1 for all
panels. Table 9 and 12 therefore display the same results.
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Table 9: Dumitrescu-Hurlin Granger non-causality test with 1 lag
Direction Zbar (ZN,T ) Zbar tilde (Z˜N) Lags
All panel Exp → Aid 14.360*** 12.829*** 1
All panel Aid → Exp 4.091*** 3.478*** 1
Asia Exp → Aid 11.066*** 9.898*** 1
Asia Aid → Exp 2.603*** 2.192** 1
Africa Exp → Aid 8.057*** 7.220*** 1
Africa Aid → Exp 1.763* 1.490 1
Latin America Exp → Aid 2.633*** 2.277** 1
Latin America Aid → Exp 2.849*** 2.474** 1
High exports Exp → Aid 12.911*** 11.581*** 1
High exports Aid → Exp 2.596*** 2.190** 1
Low exports Exp → Aid 7.397*** 6.561*** 1
Low exports Aid → Exp 3.189*** 2.729*** 1
High aid Exp → Aid 9.942*** 8.879*** 1
High aid Aid → Exp 2.921*** 2.485** 1
Low aid Exp → Aid 10.365*** 9.264*** 1
Low aid Aid → Exp 2.865*** 2.434** 1
Note: *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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Table 10: Dumitrescu-Hurlin Granger non-causality test with AIC option for
lags
Direction Zbar (ZN,T ) Zbar tilde (Z˜N) Lags
All panel Exp → Aid 6.452*** 5.374*** 2
All panel Aid → Exp 4.091*** 3.478*** 1
Asia Exp → Aid 5.365*** 4.305*** 3
Asia Aid → Exp 2.603*** 2.192** 1
Africa Exp → Aid 5.740*** 4.937*** 2
Africa Aid → Exp 1.763* 1.490 1
Latin America Exp → Aid 0.618 0.299 3
Latin America Aid → Exp 3.300*** 2.757*** 2
High exports Exp → Aid 12.911*** 11.581*** 1
High exports Aid → Exp 2.596*** 2.190** 1
Low exports Exp → Aid 4.199*** 3.301*** 3
Low exports Aid → Exp 3.189*** 2.729*** 1
High aid Exp → Aid 8.430*** 6.971*** 3
High aid Aid → Exp 2.921*** 2.485** 1
Low aid Exp → Aid 3.346*** 2.718*** 2
Low aid Aid → Exp 2.865*** 2.434** 1
Note: *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
74
Table 11: Dumitrescu-Hurlin Granger non-causality test with HQIC option
for lags
Direction Zbar (ZN,T ) Zbar tilde (Z˜N) Lags
All panel Exp → Aid 14.360*** 12.829*** 1
All panel Aid → Exp 4.091*** 3.478*** 1
Asia Exp → Aid 11.066*** 9.898*** 1
Asia Aid → Exp 2.603*** 2.192** 1
Africa Exp → Aid 8.057*** 7.220*** 1
Africa Aid → Exp 1.763* 1.490 1
Latin America Exp → Aid 2.633*** 2.277** 1
Latin America Aid → Exp 2.849*** 2.474** 1
High exports Exp → Aid 12.911*** 11.581*** 1
High exports Aid → Exp 2.596*** 2.190** 1
Low exports Exp → Aid 3.154*** 2.546** 2
Low exports Aid → Exp 3.189*** 2.729*** 1
High aid Exp → Aid 8.430*** 6.971*** 3
High aid Aid → Exp 2.921*** 2.485** 1
Low aid Exp → Aid 10.365*** 9.264*** 1
Low aid Aid → Exp 2.865*** 2.434** 1
Note: *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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Table 12: Dumitrescu-Hurlin Granger non-causality test with BIC option for
lags
Direction Zbar (ZN,T ) Zbar tilde (Z˜N) Lags
All panel Exp → Aid 14.360*** 12.829*** 1
All panel Aid → Exp 4.091*** 3.478*** 1
Asia Exp → Aid 11.066*** 9.898*** 1
Asia Aid → Exp 2.603*** 2.192** 1
Africa Exp → Aid 8.057*** 7.220*** 1
Africa Aid → Exp 1.763* 1.490 1
Latin America Exp → Aid 2.633*** 2.277** 1
Latin America Aid → Exp 2.849*** 2.474** 1
High exports Exp → Aid 12.911*** 11.581*** 1
High exports Aid → Exp 2.596*** 2.190** 1
Low exports Exp → Aid 7.397*** 6.561*** 1
Low exports Aid → Exp 3.189*** 2.729*** 1
High aid Exp → Aid 9.942*** 8.879*** 1
High aid Aid → Exp 2.921*** 2.485** 1
Low aid Exp → Aid 10.365*** 9.264*** 1
Low aid Aid → Exp 2.865*** 2.434** 1
Note: *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
6 Discussion and limitations
As we have seen, there are different tests to check for unit roots in time-series
and there are also different methods to test for causality. These differences
arise because each method is based on particular hypotheses and therefore
each has its own pros and cons. Two main issues discussed in the literature of
unit root/panel non-causality tests are serial correlation and cross sectional
dependence. In the present study, we have used four different unit root
tests in order get robust results. Three of the four unit root tests allow for
serial correlation and one allows for cross-sectional dependence. Concerning
the latter issue, and to hopefully definitely discard the possibility of non-
robust results due to cross-sectional dependence, we have run the three tests
that do not control for cross-sectional dependence with the specification of
subtracting the cross-sectional means in order to mitigate this issue.
The same problem of cross-sectional dependence can potentially also al-
ter the results obtained with the Dumitrescu-Hurlin Granger non-causality
test. However, as already mentioned, the authors have run Monte-Carlo sim-
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ulations and their conclusion is that their statistics have good small sample
properties even in the presence of cross-sectional dependence.
Another topic of discussion is the bivariate model used in the present
study to test for Granger causality (see equation (2)). Indeed, even if such a
bivariate model, that is a model with a single independent variable, is what is
mainly used in studies testing for Granger causality, one could argue that an
additional variable may be included as control variable (trivariate model).
For instance, in our case, we may want to account for trade agreements,
Gross Domestic Product, growth rate or trade openness of the recipients.44
To do so, the technique proposed by Dumitrescu and Hurlin (2012), devel-
oped within a bivariate model, needs to be extended to multivariate models.
Further work in this direction would be a clear improvement.
Then, a limitation specific to our study is that since the tests implemented
require a balanced panel dataset, we had to drop some available observations.
However, since the remaining data set is still large, we believe this issue does
not affect the results.
Finally, another limitation is the number of lags to include when run-
ning the Dumitrescu-Hurlin Granger non-causality tests. In their paper,
Dumitrescu and Hurlin (2012) do not give any hint concerning how to select
the number of lags. Lopez and Weber (2017) have proposed to select the
number of lags by minimizing standard information criteria. In the panel
data context, tests being based on individual-specific regressions, the infor-
mation criteria have to be calculated as averages of individual statistics. This
44As a robustness check (of potential spurious results due to the lack of other relevant
variables in the model), we ran, on the same panel and group of countries as the ones
presented in section 3, standard Granger causality tests on equations estimated thanks
to panel vector autoregression models (bivariate and trivariate) as discussed and imple-
mented in the Stata software by Abrigo and Love (2016). Results (not reported in this
study, available upon request) on bivariate models are more nuanced than those in the
present contribution, that is, whereas exports seem to Granger cause ODA regardless of
the group of countries under investigation, Granger causality is bi-directional only for two
group of countries, namely, the group of countries with which Switzerland trades the least
and the one to which Switzerland donates the most. Regarding the results on trivariate
models, augmented with the use of three different variables (i.e., recipients’ GDP, free
trade agreement between Switzerland and the recipients and a variable on the indepen-
dence status of the recipient), they qualify the statement that exports Granger cause
ODA regardless of the group of countries but on the other hand reinforces the result
that Granger causality exists and is bi-directional for the group of countries with which
Switzerland trades the least. With respect to the present contribution, a further devel-
opment of the Dumitrescu-Hurlin Granger non-causality test for trivariate models would
be necessary to check the robustness of the results. One could even go further and test
for Granger causality in models with more than one additional variable (see for instance
Pradhan et al. (2017)).
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may lead to situations where the average information criteria are driven by a
few individuals of the panel. There is probably still room for improvements
here.
7 Conclusion
In this study, we investigated the causal relationships between bilateral ODA
and exports. Four different unit root tests, carefully selected to mitigate pos-
sible serial correlation and cross sectional dependence issues, have been im-
plemented. Bilateral ODA and exports are found to be stationary processes.
This result allows us to use Dumitrescu-Hurlin Granger non-causality tests to
investigate causality in a second step. The null hypothesis, of non-causality
for all countries, is systematically rejected except for the “African” countries,
in the direction from ODA to exports, where a doubt of Granger causality
remains. ODA and trade flows towards African countries (that represent
more than 50% of the countries included in our data set) vary substantially
across years and nations of the continent, probably due the highly unstable
economic and political situation of many of those countries. We believe this
instability to be the reason why Granger causality is not found from ODA
to exports, at least according to the Z˜N statistic.
On the whole, some amounts of ODA may have been allocated due to past
amounts of exports towards the recipient country. But, and as an interesting
result for politicians, some exports to a given country seem to have been
realized thanks to past amounts of bilateral ODA. The political message
that should go along with this result is that when bilateral ODA is allocated,
Switzerland gets some economic benefit later on, through its exports. This
result basically means that when Switzerland gives 1CHF it is actually giving
up less than 1CHF since the 1CHF donated will bring back some revenues
through induced Swiss exports (and because providing ODA has some effects
on the donor’s aggregate demand as discussed by Lopez and Schönenberger
(2018)). Two implications arise from this fact: 1) total ODA allocated can be
increased as a kind of investment since there is an economic return through
exports, 2) if total ODA allocated is cut, Switzerland should expect a drop
in exports or at least a change in its geographical allocation.
Aid allocation is always a topic of discussion in Switzerland and more
generally in all donor countries. In 2016, Switzerland has disbursed as official
development assistance 3,529.1 millions of CHF. Even if this amount seems
large, it is equivalent to only 0.53% of the Swiss Gross National Income
(GNI), which is still far from the 0.7% prescribed by Pearson Commission in
1970. Switzerland ranks 8th among the 29 member countries of the OECD
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Development Assistance Committee (DAC) but comes second in terms of
the highest GNI per capita (Norway is first).45 Together, this ascertainment
and our results, should give Swiss politicians confidence to increase the total
amount of official development assistance.
The procedure proposed in this study can be applied to any donor country
but with some modifications in particular when the unit root tests show non-
stationarity in the series. Obviously, further work is still required in order to
deal with some limitations such as cross-sectional dependence or absence of
exogenous explanatory variables. However, we strongly believe the method
employed here is a good starting point to analyze if there exists a statistical
link between official development assistance and trade.
45Data comes from the World Bank statistic portal.
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Appendix A
Table A.1: Country characteristics
Country Continent High/low exports High/low aid
Algeria Africa H L
Angola Africa L L
Bangladesh Asia H H
Benin Africa L H
Bolivia Latin America L H
Brazil Latin America H L
Burkina Faso Africa L H
Burundi Africa L L
Cameroon Africa L L
Chad Africa L H
Chile Latin America H L
Colombia Latin America H H
Congo, Dem. Rep. Africa L L
Costa Rica Latin America H L
Cote d’Ivoire Africa H L
Ecuador Latin America H L
Egypt Africa H H
Ethiopia Africa L H
Ghana Africa L H
Guatemala Latin America H L
Haiti Latin America L L
Honduras Latin America L H
India Asia H H
Indonesia Asia H H
Jordan Asia H L
Kenya Africa H H
Lebanon Asia H L
Madagascar Africa L H
Mali Africa L H
Morocco Africa H L
Mozambique Africa L H
Myanmar Asia L L
Nepal Asia L H
Nicaragua Latin America L H
Niger Africa L H
Pakistan Asia H H
Paraguay Latin America L L
Peru Latin America H H
Rwanda Africa L H
Senegal Africa L L
Sri Lanka Asia H H
Sudan Africa H H
Tanzania Africa L H
Thailand Asia H L
Tunisia Africa H L
Turkey Europe H L
Uganda Africa L L
Vietnam Asia H H
Zambia Africa L L
Zimbabwe Africa L L
Notes: high/low exports/aid = above/below median exports/aid. H = High and L = Low.
Given that Turkey is the only European country in the panel, an “European” group of
countries has not been created.
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Chapter 4: The Impact of
Bilateral Official Development
Assistance on the Donor
Exports: Empirical Evidence
for Switzerland§
1 Introduction
Our economies have drastically changed during the past centuries, in many
ways. For instance, if it was difficult some decades ago to find foreign food in
the supermarkets, it is not the case anymore in most of the countries. Even
if borders still exist and will probably continue to do so for a long time, trade
intensity has tremendously risen, particularly among developed nations. In-
deed, in some of the latter, exports are now a major component of GDP. For
instance, according to the Swiss Federal Statistical Office, Swiss exports of
goods and services accounted for more than 65% of the Swiss GDP in 201646.
Conversely, the World Bank has reported that exports relative to GDP reach
only 27.1% in the sub-Saharan Africa region.47 These differences in trade
intensities may foster gaps in wealth among countries or world regions. To
mitigate those gaps, the OECD has been encouraging its member countries
to assist less developed countries. Those industrialized nations that have
adhered to the OECD mission are members of the Development Assistance
Committee (DAC). In the present study we refer to them as “donor coun-
tries”. The assistance they provide that meets the eligibility criteria of the
DAC is known as “Official Development Assistance” (ODA) (also called aid).
Beneficiaries of ODA are called “recipient countries”.
Currently, around thirty countries are members of the DAC. They basi-
cally use two channels to provide ODA, bilateral or multilateral. The former
comprises ODA flows directly going to recipient countries whereas the latter
§This paper was presented at a Trent University seminar, Peterborough (Canada),
April 2018
46The complete report is available in French, German or Italian on the Swiss Federal
Statistical Office website. The following provisional numbers for 2016 are given in the
report: Swiss nominal GDP in millions is 658,978 CHF and Swiss exports of goods and
services, also in nominal terms and in millions, amounts to 433,682 CHF.
47Exports and GDP in nominal terms.
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encompasses contributions to international institutions that, in turn, dis-
tribute the amount collected among several recipients. Bilateral ODA is of
primary interest in the present study since it allows to identify who donates
to whom, when and by how much. Thus, one can therefore enquire what im-
pact those bilateral flows may have on the countries involved. More precisely,
can bilateral ODA at least partially explain other economic or financial flows
between the donor and the recipient or enlighten some of their economic fea-
tures? From this questioning have originated a large scope of studies. We
can classify them in basically two strands: 1) the ones that have looked at
recipient countries to see if ODA flows received have allowed them to, for
instance, grow faster (see Burnside and Dollar (2000)) or increase their ex-
ports (see Nowak-Lehmann et al. (2013)) and, 2) the ones that have focused
on donor countries to find out if the aid they have donated has had an im-
pact on, for instance, their trade balance with the recipient countries (see for
instance Martínez-Zarzoso et al. (2009) or Nowak-Lehmann et al. (2009)).
A common model used in both categories (at least whenever ODA is used
to explain trade flows) during the last two decades, is the so-called gravity
model of trade. The present study belongs to the second literature strand
since we focus on Switzerland, a donor country which happens to be one of
the richest nations on earth.
From an economic policy perspective, the fact that bilateral official de-
velopment assistance may have a positive impact on the donor’s economy is
far from being trivial. Indeed, if ODA implies economic returns, it could,
or even should, be considered as an additional investment opportunity just
as, for instance, foreign direct investments. Such an outcome can play a role
when deciding the total ODA envelope (and its composition) a donor will
allocate, simply because if there are positive returns, at least part of total
ODA donated is actually not a donation but an (involuntary) investment.
Furthermore, depending on the tying status of ODA, economic returns can
vary substantially. As a matter of fact, tied aid, which is mostly aid in the
form of goods or services produced by the donor, tends to exhibit higher eco-
nomic returns as Pettersson and Johansson (2013) show. The fact that we
focus on Switzerland is what makes our contribution depart from the existing
literature. Indeed, a significant peculiarity of Swiss bilateral ODA is that it
is almost totally untied. This observation does not mean that economic re-
turns could not exist (see Arvin and Baum (1997)) but the pay-off structure
from bilateral ODA may be very different from that of other countries that
have so far been investigated in the literature.
Based on Prais-Winsten fixed-effect estimations of an augmented dynamic
gravity model of trade using data on 95 recipient countries over 51 years, we
find that the impact of one dollar of Swiss bilateral ODA on Swiss exports to
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the recipient countries varies from 0.59 (short run) to 1.73 (long run) USD.
Furthermore, we also find that significant effects only exist when ODA is
allocated towards a specific group of recipients, namely the ones with which
Switzerland trades the least but to which it donates the most. Moreover,
returns on ODA are higher when bilateral ODA flows to African or Asian
countries rather than to European or Latin American countries.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses relevant
literature on ODA and its possible link to other economic variables. Section 3
provides information on the data used and describes the various groups of
countries studied. Section 4 presents the model, going through its variables as
well as their expected signs. Section 5 presents the main results. Section 6
discusses the limitations of this study and directions for future research.
Section 7 concludes and provides some policy implications.
2 Literature review
Since the seminal contribution by McCallum (1995), the effect of economic
variables on trade flows has received considerable attention in the empirical
macro-economic literature. For instance, and related to our topic, Arvin
et al. (1996) have shown in their contribution that foreign Canadian aid has
a lingering/persistent effect on the country’s exports. Based on McCallum
(1995), Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) and Silva and Nelson (2012) show
that an appropriate model to use in this framework is an augmented gravity
model of trade. Whereas most authors have focused on ODA’s impact on
recipient countries, some others have devoted their attention to the donor
countries.
Considering that the main objective of ODA is to promote the economic
development and welfare of developing countries, it is rather obvious why
researchers have put energy in trying to find out if ODA was indeed helping
recipients to increase their export flows (it is well-known that exports are
key for growth). Conclusions of studies published within the last decade are
however conflicting. For instance, Pettersson and Johansson (2009, 2013)
do find a positive relationship between ODA and recipients’ exports whereas
Nowak-Lehmann et al. (2013) who use a model that takes into account dyadic
fixed effects, autocorrelation and endogeneity, find no significant effect. The
conclusion of Helble et al. (2012) corroborates this disagreement since they
find evidence that only a small part of ODA, that is Aid for Trade (AfT), is
related to higher exports for the recipient country. It is worth noting that
these studies adopt a multi-recipient and multi-donor approach as opposed to
those adopting a one-recipient and/or one-donor strategy. One can therefore
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wonder if results would have been different if only one recipient country had
been considered, therefore allowing the inclusion of country-specific explana-
tory variables.
Concerning the second literature strand, namely studies focusing on donor
countries, there are also reasons why researchers have dedicated time to that
topic, even though they are less straightforward. However, if in any way
ODA contributions impact the donor’s economy this must be known by the
country’s policy makers in order to properly ascertain the whys and where-
fores of providing ODA, particularly if reductions or rises of total ODA are
planned. In their contribution, Martínez-Zarzoso et al. (2009) give three dif-
ferent reasons why ODA could lead to higher exports for the donor country.
First, part of ODA could be tied, meaning that ODA received has to be spent
in the donor country. Such aid leads by definition to higher exports for the
donor. Second, ODA provided may create habit-formation. For instance, if
at time t, ODA is disbursed in the form of goods produced by the donor,
it may create a dependence on those goods leading to a need for importing
them again at time t + 1 (similar to the lingering effect discussed by Arvin
et al. (1996)). This effect, largely discussed by Djajić et al. (2004), goes well
beyond the initial impact of aid and since it spreads over time, it is much
more difficult to measure. Last but not least, when a donor allocates ODA
to a recipient country, it sends a positive signal to the recipient country in
the same way as an advertisement paves the way for a product on the mar-
ket. This is particularly true if ODA is untied. This phenomenon is known
as the “goodwill effect”. In their contribution, Arvin and Baum (1997) find
evidence that donors grant a constant amount of untied aid over the years
precisely to keep constant the stock of goodwill.
Whereas in the first literature strand, studies differ on the magnitude
and on the significance of the coefficient attached to ODA, in the second
strand, differences across studies are predominantly on the size rather than
on the significance of the coefficient. Among “recent” studies adopting a
multi-donor perspective, one can mention, for instance, Wagner (2003) who
has shown that, depending on the method of estimation, the magnitude of
the coefficient of interest changes drastically although it remains significant
regardless of the estimation method. Using a pooled OLS, the author found a
total impact of aid on exports of 2.29 USD for each dollar of aid whereas using
a fixed effect model the total impact decreases to 0.73 USD. Pettersson and
Johansson (2013) also find a statistically significant relationship between aid
and exports of the donors, particularly when aid is disaggregated and only
“Aid for Trade” is kept. Recently, also using a multi-donor approach and
employing a model that controls for unobserved heterogeneity and includes
multilateral resistance factors, Martínez-Zarzoso et al. (2014) found an av-
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erage positive effect of aid on the donors’ exports. However, the authors
mitigate their finding by stating that the effect highly depends on the spec-
ification of the model. They further state that their discovered effect varies
across donors as well as time and depends on the tying status of aid.
Regarding the very scarce literature with focus on a particular donor, one
can first mention Vogler-Ludwig et al. (1999). The authors used a reduced
version of a gravity model (with only recipient’s GNP and ODA from the rest
of the World as additional regressors) to compute German aid’s marginal
export elasticity. They found a surprisingly high elasticity of 0.366. In
absolute terms and given that German exports and ODA were, respectively,
758 and 64 billion Deutsche Mark (DEM) (over the time period analyzed,
that is, 1976 to 1995), an increase of 1 DEM was accompanied, on average, by
an export increase of 4.3 DEM. We believe the lack of additional regressors
to be the reason of their very high return on aid.48 A decade later, Martínez-
Zarzoso et al. (2009) found, also using German data, a significant impact of
aid on German exports. In their preferred model, namely a dynamic two-
stage feasible generalized least squares model (with fixed effects), they find
that in the long run, each US dollar of bilateral aid increases exports by
approximately 1.40 dollar. In the same vein and also for Germany, Nowak-
Lehmann et al. (2009) found, using time series techniques, an average return
of each dollar of aid allocated varying between 1.04 USD (using an error
correction model) and 1.50 USD (using a dynamic OLS model).
The present contribution, in line with Martínez-Zarzoso et al. (2009),
focuses on Switzerland, a country arguably considered as one of the most
altruistic donor countries due to its relatively high share of untied aid.
3 Data sources
In order to investigate the relationship between Swiss bilateral ODA and
exports, we had to construct a data set based on a multitude of different
sources. The most relevant information, namely data on Swiss foreign aid
and exports to other countries, are taken from Swiss Federal Department of
Foreign Affairs49 and UN COMTRADE, respectively. Data on gross domes-
tic product are from the Penn World Table and those on population from the
World Bank. Bilateral exchange rates are taken from the International Mon-
etary Fund (IMF) database. ODA allocated by any other country different
from Switzerland (and towards the same recipients to which Switzerland do-
48For a summary of Vogler-Ludwig et al. (1999) in English, see Schönherr and Vogler-
Ludwig (2002).
49Data are available in CHF. We have converted data from CHF to USD using annu-
alized exchange rates provided by the OECD.
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nates) are obtained from the OECD database. Data on free trade agreements
between Switzerland and the recipient countries are provided by the Swiss
State Secretariat for Economic Affairs. The WTO provides membership of
a recipient country to the GATT/WTO. Finally, the CIA World Fact book
provides information on the “independence” status of the recipient country.
The definition of independence is the one provided by the CIA World Fact
book, that is, “a country is considered as independent if it is politically or-
ganized into a sovereign state and has a definite territory”.
Switzerland has been assisting through its ODA programs and projects
around one hundred countries over more than fifty years. However, data are
unfortunately not available for all countries and all years. Nevertheless, our
database, strongly unbalanced, remains rather large with 95 countries over
51 years (from 1963 to 2013).50 To capture potential geographical effects,
we have created several groups of countries, namely African, Latin Ameri-
can, Asian and European51. Then, to take into account possible level effects,
we have divided our original panel in two, according to ODA disbursements
(above and below whole period median ODA disbursements). We did the
same grouping according to exports. Appendix A lists the 105 countries
towards which Switzerland has donated ODA at least once and, more im-
portantly, the subset of 95 countries52 used in our regressions as well as their
classification in their respective groups. Table 1 here below displays the
descriptive statistics corresponding to the full panel (95 countries).
50Data has been collected until 2017 when available. However, since exchange rate fig-
ures (from the IMF) have been, at this time, published only until 2013, the time dimension
of the panel is restricted.
51Aid towards the Part II list of countries and territories in transition, such as the
Eastern European countries, is called Official Aid (OA).
52Countries are discarded when data on one or more variables used in our models are
missing.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Mean Standard Deviation Min. Max.
ODA (in thousands) 4544.5 7714.3 23.1 163496
Exports (in thousands) 87283.6 381341.6 1.0 9971193
GDP (in millions) 168808.4 710492.8 147.8 15651357
Population (in thousands) 40669.5 143863.9 100.6 1357380
Exchange rate 106.5015 430.0278 5.69e-14 5716.965
Aid from others (in thousands) 276058.1 606359.8 0 21844320
Free Trade Agreement .0281 .1652 0 1
WTO membership .5350 .4988 0 1
Independent .8745 .3313 0 1
Note: negative and zero figures of ODA (plausible due to the fact that “debt repayments” are considered as
ODA) have been considered as missing in order to 1) log-linearize the variable, and 2) because data reported
did not differentiate a zero aid figure due to no ODA or due to debt repayments canceling positive ODA
figures. Population and GDP are from the recipient countries. Monetary variables are in US Dollars.
4 The model
4.1 Model specification
Once again, our aim is to relate Swiss bilateral ODA to Swiss bilateral ex-
ports. Particularly, we want to establish both the significance and the size of
the impact of bilateral ODA on exports. Following the literature, we model
Swiss exports to recipient country i in year t, Expit, using an augmented
gravity model of the form:
Expit = αAidβ1it
∏K
k=1(X
βk+1
kit ) (1)
where α is a constant, Aidit is foreign bilateral aid from Switzerland to re-
cipient i in the same year and Xkit is a set of k additional control vari-
ables describing the recipient country or some feature of its relationship with
Switzerland that may augment or lower the “attraction”, namely exports,
between the two countries.
If we log-linearize equation (1) in order to obtain elasticities as coefficients,
we end up estimating a model comparable to the one in Martínez-Zarzoso
et al. (2009) or Martínez-Zarzoso et al. (2014)), that is:
lnExpit = φ0 + ϕi + β1lnAidit + β2lnGDPTt + β3lnPopTt + β4lnExRit+
β5lnAidOit + β6lnFTAit + β7lnGATTWTOit + β8lnIndit + it
(2)
where ln denotes variables in natural logs and Expit are exports from Switzer-
land to recipient country i in period t expressed in nominal USD. Aidit is bi-
87
lateral gross official development assistance disbursement from Switzerland to
recipient country i in period t in USD ; lnGDPTt = ln(GDPst∗GDPit), where
GDPst and GDPit are respectively the Swiss and recipient country i gross
domestic products in period t in PPP USD; lnPopTt = ln(Popst ∗ Popit)53,
where Popst and Popit are respectively the Swiss and recipient country i
populations in period t; ExRit is the nominal annual bilateral exchange rate
of recipient country i currency per CHF in period t; AidOit is the official
development assistance allocated by other countries to recipient country i in
period t in USD; FTAit is a dummy variable taking the value of one if there
is a trade agreement between Switzerland and recipient country i in period t;
GATTWTOit is a dummy variable taking the value one if recipient country i
is member of the GATT/WTO in period t; Indit is a dummy variable taking
the value one if recipient country i is “independent” in period t. Finally, φ0 is
a constant, it is an idiosyncratic error term and ϕi are individual (country)
effects. Those effects capture everything that is country-pair specific and
that does not vary over time, as for instance a fundamental variable in the
basic gravity model, namely the distance between the two countries.
Intuitively, we expect the coefficient attached to GDP to be positive if
significant simply because the more productive a pair of countries, the higher
the probability to find trade opportunities between the two. Regarding the
coefficient attached to population, there is no clear expectation on its sign
since highly populated countries are not necessarily economically wealthier
countries. Concerning the coefficients of variables FTA, GATT/WTO and
Ind, we expect them to be positive since these variables may facilitate trade.
Regarding the exchange rate coefficient, which is defined as the nominal
bilateral exchange rate of the recipient country currency per CHF, we expect
it to be negative. Indeed, an increase of the exchange rate is associated with
a depreciation of the recipient country currency implying a drop in their
capacity to import.
Regarding the variable aid from other countries, and before talking about
the expected sign of the associated coefficient, an explanation on why we in-
clude this variable is necessary. As mentioned in our brief literature review,
there are several reasons why we expect bilateral aid to have an impact on
bilateral exports for the donor country, one of them being the so-called good-
will effect. We believe that if a recipient country receives bilateral aid only
from Switzerland, this will not have the same impact on the two countries’
trade relationship compared to the case where the aid received from Switzer-
53In a single donor approach, it does not make sense to include in the model variables
such as Swiss GDP or Swiss Pop. Therefore, coefficients of Swiss GDP/Pop and recipient
GDP/Pop are restricted to be equal.
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land represents only a small share of the total aid obtained. Put differently,
aid from others may diminish the goodwill effect and/or the habit forma-
tion effect on a given Swiss-recipient country-pair, we therefore expect the
coefficient to be negative. Last but not least, and in view of what has been
discussed earlier, we expect the coefficient attached to the variable of interest
in the present study, that is bilateral aid, to be positive and significant.
4.2 Model estimation
Static estimations restrict the effect of aid on exports to take place during the
same year but this may not necessarily be correct because of habit formation
or because some of the purchases made related to this year’s aid may be done
(or disbursed) during the following year(s). This is precisely what Arvin et al.
(1996) proved in their contribution when they found, using Canadian data, a
lingering effect of aid on exports. Our model can therefore be extended to a
habit formation/gradual adjustment specification where the observed tempo-
ral differences in (logarithm of) exports only reflect a fraction of the temporal
difference in exports that would be needed to reach the aid-determined equi-
librium. So, we assume: lnExpit − lnExpit−1 = λ(lnExp∗it − lnExpit−1),
where λ ∈ [0, 1] is an adjustment parameter that represents the ratio be-
tween observed change in exports from change in exports necessary to attain
the new equilibrium level of export flows, which depends (at least partially)
on the new level of aid in t. Under the assumption that the long-term equi-
librium export flow Exp∗it can also be expressed in the form of a standard
gravity model, we have: Exp∗it = φAid
γ1
it
∏K
k=1(X
γk+1
kit ) with γ1 representing
the long run aid elasticity of exports. This processing is called a Koyck trans-
formation. Then, if we log-linearize and include a composite error term, θit,
the above difference model can be reformulated to obtain:
lnExpit = λlnφ+ λγ1lnAidit +
∑K
k=1 γklnXkit + (1− λ)lnExpit−1 + θit (3)
where λγ1 give the short run elasticity. The corresponding long run elasticity
can then be obtained by standardizing the short-term ones by the estimate of
λ, which is easily obtained by subtracting the coefficient of the lag dependent
variable from one. We expect the coefficient attached to the lagged dependent
variable (1− λ) to be significant and relatively close to unity.
A wide variety of methods can be used due to recent developments in econo-
metrics to estimate equations (2) or (3). This might to some extent explain
why we find heterogeneous results on the magnitude of return on aid in the
literature. To study the Swiss case, we use in the present study a mix of the
methods employed in the recent relevant literature discussed above in section
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2 as well as a method developed by Hsiao et al. (2002) that uses unconditional
quasi-maximum likelihood estimators (method used as robustness check). As
mentioned above, we include in the model individual effects that act as a
proxy for multilateral “resistance factors”. As initially argued by Anderson
and van Wincoop (2003), these effects are important to include since a drop
of resistance (i.e. a decline in trade costs) between Switzerland and a given
recipient country leads to a relatively higher resistance between Switzerland
and the other recipients and vice-versa. Encouraged by the results of a Haus-
man test, we assume these effects to be fixed (as opposed to random) and
therefore estimate our model using within regressions. After a meticulous
inspection of our preliminary regressions, we found the presence of autocor-
relation (serial correlation) and heteroskedasticity. Thus, as a second step we
ran Prais-Winsten fixed effect regressions (panel-corrected standard errors,
PCSE). Then, as we have just argued, we modified our model from static to
dynamic by adding a lag of the dependent variable as an additional regressor
(from equation 2 to 3). Even if the inclusion in the model of the past value
of exports as an explanatory variable may wrongly diminish the explanatory
power of the exogenous variables in the model (see Achen (2001)), failure to
include it would probably create omitted variable bias. But, it is important
to note that since the additional regressor is endogenous, this could result in
potential bias and inconsistent estimates as pointed out by Nickell (1981).
However, as the author emphasizes, such a risk is particularly high when T
is small, which is not our case. Nevertheless, as a robustness check, we used,
besides a Prais-Winsten fixed effect regression, a second dynamic panel esti-
mation method on our full panel, namely the one discussed by Hsiao et al.
(2002). Their method uses the unconditional Quasi-Maximum Likelihood
(QML) estimator for linear dynamic panel models with fixed effects. Ac-
cording to the authors, this method has better finite sample properties than
the GMM approach. The QML method of estimation can be easily used by
practitioners thanks to the work of Kripfganz (2016) who has implemented
the method in the Stata software.
5 Results
Table 2 reports our results using the above discussed estimation methods.
Coefficients that are consistently significant exhibit the expected signs, with
the notable exception of the one attached to population which is in one model
significant and positive and in others significant but negative. As expected,
GDP mass of the country-pair seems to have a sizable positive impact on
donor exports. Unsurprisingly, the exchange rate coefficients turn out to be
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negative and significant. Regarding the variable of interest in the present
study, its coefficient is always significant and its size, namely the short run
ODA-elasticity of exports, varies between 0.0276 and 0.0522 (putting aside
the results of our first regression, i.e. column (1) of table 2, that cannot be
relied upon as discussed in the previous section), our preferred model, that is,
the dynamic model (i.e. column (3)) exhibiting an elasticity of 0.0306. It is
worth noting that results of our fourth regression (that drops countries with
gaps in the data), are in line with our expectation that due to the long time
period available, our method of estimation (Prais-Winsten fixed effect) does
not suffer from the so-called Nickell bias. We therefore confidently employ
Prais-Winsten fixed effect regressions on all of our groupings of countries.
Table 2: Panel regressions, full dataset
(1) (2) (3) (4)
FE Static PW Dynamic PW Dynamic QML
Lag 1 of Exports 0.6611*** 0.7082***
(0.0248) (0.0180)
Aid 0.1148*** 0.0522*** 0.0306*** 0.0276**
(0.0116) (0.0128) (0.0108) (0.0130)
GDP 0.8974*** 0.8722*** 0.3554*** 0.3665***
(0.0312) (0.0678) (0.0354) (0.0391)
Population 0.0696 0.3646** −0.1221* −0.1582*
(0.0779) (0.1851) (0.0742) (0.0829)
Exchange rate −0.1079*** −0.1147*** −0.0241* −0.0416***
(0.0153) (0.0303) (0.0130) (0.0142)
Aid from others −0.0077 −0.0022 −0.0032 −0.0009
(0.0053) (0.0028) (0.0026) (0.0070)
Free Trade Agreement 0.1830** 0.0879 0.0595 −0.0775
(0.0796) (0.1018) (0.0506) (0.0690)
WTO membership −0.0771 0.0323 −0.0318 −0.0227
(0.0479) (0.0713) (0.0335) (0.0450)
Independent 0.1233 0.0859 0.0057 −0.3038*
(0.1333) (0.1847) (0.0974) (0.1761)
#Obs. 3,420 3,420 3,388 1,784
#Countries 95 95 95 51
Note: *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Columns: (1) within regression, (2) static Prais-Winsten
fixed effect regression, (3) dynamic fixed effect Prais-Winsten regression, (4) Quasi-Maximum Likelihood
estimation.
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The elasticities obtained are rather small. A 1% increase in aid only
implies a 0.0306% increase in exports in the short run. However, since exports
are so much larger than aid, it is worthwhile to transform our elasticities into
impacts in absolute terms (slope) to get a more meaningful representation
of the impact. Aid-elasticities of exports of our dynamic model (column (3))
can be used to compute, respectively, the short run and long run impacts
of 1 USD of bilateral aid on Swiss bilateral exports. Thus, the short run
impact of 1 USD of bilateral aid, is calculated by means of the following
transformation:
∂Exp
∂Aid
= βAid ∗ ExpAid = 0.0306 ∗ 87,283,6274,544,491 = 0.59. (4)
Regarding the long run impact, it can be computed as:
βAid
1−βExpt−1
∗ Exp
Aid
= 0.03061−0.6611 ∗ 87,283,6274,544,491 = 1.73. (5)
These latter results suggest that for each USD donated, Switzerland gets
back, through an increase in exports towards the recipients, around 0.59
USD in the short run and 1.73 USD in the long run.
As a robustness check, the same kind of regressions (Prais-Winsten fixed
effect regressions on our static and dynamic models) are run on the different
group of countries discussed earlier. Results can be found in tables 4 to 10.
In a nutshell, what those regressions on different groupings of countries tell
us is that bilateral aid returns (in form of exports) are significant if ODA is
allocated to countries towards which Switzerland has below-median export
flows and above-median aid flows. Those countries are mainly located in the
African continent. Our results based on grouping of countries based on their
geographical location confirm our previous finding since returns appear to be
statistically significant when aid is allocated to African countries. Addition-
ally, results also show that positive (and particularly high) and significant
bilateral aid return also exist for ODA allocated to Asian countries. Ta-
ble 3 below summarizes the short run and long run returns of 1 US dollar of
bilateral aid on exports for those two groups of countries.
Table 3: Return on aid by region
Africa Asia
Short run return 0.20 USD 1.04 USD
Long run return 0.55 USD 2.72 USD
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A return of for instance 2.72 USD54 means that for every dollar of bilateral
aid given to Asian countries, Switzerland gains in the long run 2.72 dollars
through an increase of exports towards those same Asian countries.
Table 4: Panel regressions, high-export group of countries
(1) (2) (3)
FE Static PW Dynamic PW
Lag 1 of Exports 0.7884***
(0.0242)
Aid 0.0528*** 0.0037 0.0097
(0.0134) (0.0117) (0.0090)
GDP 0.8722*** 0.8807*** 0.2345***
(0.0360) (0.0849) (0.0345)
Population 0.3156*** 0.6423*** −0.1194
(0.0957) (0.2450) (0.0848)
Exchange rate −0.0524*** −0.1139** −0.0002
(0.0171) (0.0445) (0.0136)
Aid from others −0.0106** −0.0022 −0.0018
(0.0043) (0.0023) (0.0023)
Free Trade Agreement 0.1233* 0.0306 0.0514
(0.0693) (0.0628) (0.0329)
WTO membership 0.0247 0.0935 0.0173
(0.0550) (0.0626) (0.0295)
Independent 0.0615 0.0042 −0.0734
(0.1486) (0.2617) (0.1147)
#Obs. 1,671 1,671 1,653
#Countries 47 47 47
Note: *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Columns: (1) within regression, (2) static
Prais-Winsten fixed effect regression, (3) dynamic fixed effect Prais-Winsten regression.
This group of countries includes recipients to which Switzerland has exported above the
median (based on the whole period).
54Even if we exclude China, results remain similar.
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Table 5: Panel regressions, low-export group of countries
(1) (2) (3)
FE Static PW Dynamic PW
Lag 1 of Exports 0.6559***
(0.0269)
Aid 0.1453*** 0.1024*** 0.0405**
(0.0205) (0.0217) (0.0169)
GDP 0.8250*** 0.8332*** 0.3554***
(0.0528) (0.0900) (0.0471)
Population −0.0491 0.0910 −0.1387
(0.1239) (0.1977) (0.0928)
Exchange rate −0.1702*** −0.1442*** −0.0404**
(0.0253) (0.0390) (0.0204)
Aid from others 0.0808*** 0.0616* 0.0024
(0.0290) (0.0326) (0.0227)
Free Trade Agreement 0.1023 0.1134 −0.0897
(0.2679) (0.5178) (0.3084)
WTO membership −0.1271* −0.0426 −0.0735
(0.0763) (0.1055) (0.0498)
Independent −0.3212 −0.0987 −0.0072
(0.2419) (0.2480) (0.1453)
#Obs. 1,749 1,749 1,735
#Countries 48 48 48
Note: *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Columns: (1) within regression, (2) static
Prais-Winsten fixed effect regression, (3) dynamic fixed effect Prais-Winsten regression.
This group of countries includes recipients to which Switzerland has exported below the
median (based on the whole period).
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Table 6: Panel regressions, high-aid group of countries
(1) (2) (3)
FE Static PW Dynamic PW
Lag 1 of Exports 0.6940***
(0.0248)
Aid 0.2100*** 0.1055*** 0.0422***
(0.0173) (0.0214) (0.0146)
GDP 1.1002*** 1.1139*** 0.4071***
(0.0515) (0.0880) (0.0478)
Population −0.4862*** −0.1439 −0.2714***
(0.1220) (0.2243) (0.1049)
Exchange rate −0.1629*** −0.1738*** −0.0403**
(0.0252) (0.0446) (0.0191)
Aid from others 0.0069 0.0006 0.0006
(0.0112) (0.0069) (0.0072)
Free Trade Agreement −0.5141*** −0.2420*** −0.1541***
(0.1407) (0.0910) (0.0593)
WTO membership −0.1026 0.0392 −0.0553
(0.0720) (0.0930) (0.0459)
Independent −1.4459*** −0.7888** −0.5913**
(0.2729) (0.3072) (0.2324)
#Obs. 1,663 1,663 1,650
#Countries 47 47 47
Note: *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Columns: (1) within regression, (2) static
Prais-Winsten fixed effect regression, (3) dynamic fixed effect Prais-Winsten regression.
This group of countries includes recipients to which Switzerland has provided ODA above
the median (based on the whole period).
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Table 7: Panel regressions, low-aid group of countries
(1) (2) (3)
FE Static PW Dynamic PW
Lag 1 of Exports 0.5898***
(0.0333)
Aid 0.0458*** 0.0344** 0.0230
(0.0158) (0.0149) (0.0147)
GDP 0.7944*** 0.7493*** 0.3653***
(0.0390) (0.0839) (0.0467)
Population 0.3114*** 0.5237** −0.0418
(0.1036) (0.2217) (0.0994)
Exchange rate −0.0821*** −0.0832** −0.0200
(0.0191) (0.0389) (0.0176)
Aid from others −0.0110* −0.0023 −0.0039
(0.0060) (0.0028) (0.0026)
Free Trade Agreement 0.4804*** 0.2482 0.1918**
(0.0969) (0.1800) (0.0771)
WTO membership −0.0590 0.0384 −0.0099
(0.0650) (0.1032) (0.0477)
Independent 0.5474*** 0.5056** 0.2194**
(0.1552) (0.2374) (0.1068)
#Obs. 1,757 1,757 1,738
#Countries 48 48 48
Note: *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Columns: (1) within regression, (2) static
Prais-Winsten fixed effect regression, (3) dynamic fixed effect Prais-Winsten regression.
This group of countries includes recipients to which Switzerland has provided ODA below
the median (based on the whole period).
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Table 8: Panel regressions, African countries
(1) (2) (3)
FE Static PW Dynamic PW
Lag 1 of Exports 0.6394***
(0.0294)
Aid 0.1114*** 0.0693*** 0.0300**
(0.0182) (0.0189) (0.0148)
GDP 0.7105*** 0.6719*** 0.3174***
(0.0507) (0.0994) (0.0488)
Population 0.5242*** 0.7948*** 0.0455
(0.1178) (0.2140) (0.1014)
Exchange rate −0.2387*** −0.2584*** −0.0631***
(0.0253) (0.0405) (0.0204)
Aid from others 0.0179 0.0172 −0.0070
(0.0218) (0.0233) (0.0172)
Free Trade Agreement 0.1571 0.0972 0.0271
(0.1422) (0.2182) (0.1106)
WTO membership −0.3472*** −0.2260* −0.1419**
(0.0807) (0.1195) (0.0614)
Independent 0.0282 0.1238 0.0970
(0.2026) (0.1983) (0.1439)
#Obs. 1,685 1,685 1,667
#Countries 42 42 42
Note: *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Columns: (1) within regression, (2) static
Prais-Winsten regression, (3) dynamic Prais-Winsten regression.
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Table 9: Panel regressions, Latin American countries
(1) (2) (3)
FE Static PW Dynamic PW
Lag 1 of Exports 0.7814***
(0.0326)
Aid 0.0469** 0.0215 0.0100
(0.0221) (0.0188) (0.0132)
GDP 0.7863*** 1.0820*** 0.2425***
(0.0742) (0.1603) (0.0523)
Population −0.3936* −0.6436 −0.2772*
(0.2359) (0.5027) (0.1618)
Exchange rate 0.1071*** 0.0543 0.0231*
(0.0264) (0.0480) (0.0133)
Aid from others −0.0031 −0.0029 −0.0017
(0.0070) (0.0026) (0.0028)
Free Trade Agreement 0.4400*** 0.1237 0.1358***
(0.1189) (0.0995) (0.0501)
WTO membership −0.0551 0.0037 −0.0143
(0.0760) (0.0896) (0.0476)
#Obs. 683 683 679
#Countries 16 16 16
Note: *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Columns: (1) within regression, (2) static
Prais-Winsten regression, (3) dynamic Prais-Winsten regression.
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Table 10: Panel regressions, Asian countries
(1) (2) (3)
FE Static PW Dynamic PW
Lag 1 of Exports 0.6172***
(0.0361)
Aid 0.1218*** 0.0497** 0.0397**
(0.0223) (0.0221) (0.0186)
GDP 0.8066*** 0.9198*** 0.3691***
(0.0612) (0.0957) (0.0572)
Population 0.4763*** 0.3837 0.0078
(0.1699) (0.2764) (0.1368)
Exchange rate −0.0404 −0.0434 −0.0087
(0.0263) (0.0455) (0.0225)
Aid from others 0.0041 −0.0016 0.0008
(0.0072) (0.0048) (0.0038)
Free Trade Agreement −0.3102* −0.0349 −0.0636
(0.1872) (0.1916) (0.0956)
WTO membership 0.6263*** 0.4256*** 0.2132***
(0.0968) (0.1306) (0.0711)
Independent −0.0974 −0.0414 −0.1720
(0.2305) (0.2852) (0.1098)
#Obs. 907 907 900
#Countries 28 28 28
Note: *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Columns: (1) within regression, (2) static
Prais-Winsten regression, (3) dynamic Prais-Winsten regression.
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Table 11: Panel regressions, European countries
(1) (2) (3)
FE Static PW Dynamic PW
Lag 1 of Exports 0.4584***
(0.0878)
Aid 0.0291 −0.0042 0.0338
(0.0374) (0.0375) (0.0354)
GDP 1.0622*** 1.1355*** 0.5152***
(0.1290) (0.1737) (0.1538)
Population 2.2604*** 1.8385*** 1.2887***
(0.3879) (0.4664) (0.3771)
Exchange rate −0.4514*** −0.6310*** −0.3221*
(0.1694) (0.2191) (0.1700)
Aid from others −0.0176* −0.0012 −0.0029
(0.0092) (0.0062) (0.0059)
Free Trade Agreement −0.5115*** −0.2964** −0.2417**
(0.1238) (0.1191) (0.1066)
WTO membership 0.1958 0.1401 0.1363
(0.1259) (0.1520) (0.1141)
#Obs. 145 145 142
#Countries 9 9 9
Note: *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Columns: (1) within regression, (2) static
Prais-Winsten regression, (3) dynamic Prais-Winsten regression.
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6 Limitations and further research
Some limitations of the present study need to be mentioned. First, fur-
ther investigation on our variable of interest, namely bilateral aid, could be
worthwhile. In the present contribution we have considered bilateral aid as
exogenous whereas the literature mitigates this hypothesis by suggesting that
causality may run in both directions, that is, from exports to bilateral aid
and vice-versa.55 Dealing with this potential issue of endogeneity would be
a considerable improvement even if this task remains challenging given the
difficulty of finding appropriate instrumental variables.
Second, bilateral aid could be further divided into different types of aid,
one of them being the Aid for Trade (AfT) component. Pettersson and
Johansson (2013) show that this type of aid, tends to exhibit higher returns.
Thus, a replication of our work with AfT as an explanatory variable instead
of bilateral aid would be a useful complement to the present contribution.
In the same vein, we would also recommend the alternative use of total aid
on top of bilateral aid as an explanatory variable of export flows provided.
A clear and relevant method to correctly dispatch those multilateral flows to
the recipient countries should be found. Indeed, multilateral aid represents
a relatively important share of total aid (between 20 to 25%) and failure to
include this component represents a substantial loss of information.
Last but least, the split of bilateral aid into tied and untied aid, to capture
which one of the two types of aid exhibits the higher return would also
be a useful complement in general. However, we expect this split to be
superfluous regarding Switzerland. Indeed, over the last two decades, 95%
of Swiss bilateral ODA was untied yielding tied aid nearly insignificant.
7 Conclusion
In this study we have related Swiss bilateral official development assistance
flows to Swiss bilateral export flows (to 95 recipient countries) using an aug-
mented static and dynamic gravity model of trade. Results show that there
is indeed a positive and significant return on bilateral aid in form of bilateral
55In his contribution Brückner (2013) shows that if reverse causation between aid and
growth is taken into account, that is, higher growth in the recipients lead to lower aid
towards them, foreign aid does have a significant and positive effect on growth, contrary
to the situation where reverse causality is not explicitly allowed for. Indeed, according
to him, not taking this reverse causation into account is what leads some researchers to
fail finding significant effects of foreign aid on economic growth. In this contribution,
we did find a positive and significant impact of foreign aid on the donor’s exports but
what the finding of Brückner (2013) suggests is that the magnitude of the effect may be
underestimated.
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exports. On average, each US dollar donated implies in the long run a return
through exports of 1.73 USD.
Even if the size of the returns on aid in the present study are rather
low compared to some other studies using a multi-donor approach (see for
instance Wagner (2003)), they are in line (or even stronger) with studies
focusing on a single donor such as Martínez-Zarzoso et al. (2009) who focus
on Germany. Again, the country we use as a case study, namely Switzerland,
is significantly different from other donors since bilateral ODA it provides is
almost entirely untied. Switzerland is considered as one of the most altruistic
donors, as pointed out by Berthélemy (2006). This fact implies that two of
the three reasons, mentioned earlier in this paper, that may explain why aid
can have an impact on exports, do not really hold for Switzerland or at least
their incidence on exports is negligible. What basically remains is the long-
standing relationship impact generally known as, the goodwill effect. Thus,
and even though Pettersson and Johansson (2013) show that explicitly tied
aid (for instance grants allocated to recipient countries students to study in
donor countries) has a greater effect on exports than untied aid or implicitly
tied aid56, our finding suggest that untied aid implies similar positive effects
on the donor’s exports than tied aid (in line with Arvin et al. (1996)).
Our results are not without consequences politically speaking. Indeed,
even if it is obviously not the main and ultimate goal of aid, donating can be
seen as an investment in the same way as any other types of real or financial
investment. According to our results, this is especially true for amounts of
bilateral aid donated to Asian countries where the return is particularly high.
Of course, this does not mean that Switzerland should select recipient coun-
tries according expected returns since, the main goal of ODA is to promote
growth of income, ideally in a fair manner, across least developed countries.
Thereupon, and in the light of our results, we believe the altruistic atti-
tude of Switzerland upon dispatching their total bilateral aid envelope has
not harmed the underlying economic return. As a concluding remark, and
since the Swiss ratio of aid relative to GNI is 0.53% (2016) an increase of this
share up to the 0.7% prescribed by the Pearson Commission, would be rather
welcome especially since doing so will enable Switzerland to further increase
their exports to the recipient countries and therefore potentially boast its
own GDP over the years to come.
56If untied aid is shown to have an impact on donor exports, it is said to be implicitly
tied aid.
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Appendix A
Table A.1: Country characteristics
Country Continent High/low exports High/low aid Country Continent High/low exports High/low aid
Afghanistan Asia - - Kyrgyz Republic Asia L H
Albania Europe L H Laos Asia L L
Algeria Africa H L Lebanon Asia H L
Angola Africa H L Lesotho Africa L L
Argentina Latin America H L Liberia Africa L H
Armenia Asia L H Libya Africa - -
Azerbaijan Asia H H Madagascar Africa L H
Bangladesh Asia H H Malawi Africa L L
Belarus Europe H H Mali Africa L H
Benin Africa L H Mauritania Africa L L
Bhutan Asia L H Mexico Latin America H L
Bolivia Latin America L H Moldova Europe H H
Bosnia and Herzegovina Europe H H Mongolia Asia L L
Brazil Latin America H L Montenegro Europe H L
Burkina Faso Africa L H Morocco Africa H L
Burundi Africa L H Mozambique Africa L H
Cambodia Asia L L Myanmar Asia L L
Cameroon Africa L H Namibia Africa L L
Cape Verde Africa L L Nepal Asia L H
Central African Republic Africa L L Nicaragua Latin America L H
Chad Africa L H Niger Africa L H
Chile Latin America H L Nigeria Africa H L
China Asia H H Pakistan Asia H H
Colombia Latin America H H Paraguay Latin America L L
Congo, Dem. Rep. Africa L L Peru Latin America H H
Congo, Rep. Africa L L Philippines Asia H L
Costa Rica Latin America H L Rwanda Africa L H
Cote d’Ivoire Africa H L Senegal Africa L H
Cuba Latin America - - Serbia Europe H H
Djibouti Africa L L Sierra Leone Africa L L
Ecuador Latin America H H Somalia Africa - -
Egypt Africa H H South Africa Africa H H
El Salvador Latin America L L South Sudan Africa - -
Equatorial Guinea Africa L L Sri Lanka Asia H H
Eritrea Africa - - Sudan Africa H H
Ethiopia Africa L H Syria Asia H L
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) Europe H H Tajikistan Asia L H
Georgia Asia L H Tanzania Africa L H
Ghana Africa H L Thailand Asia H L
Guatemala Latin America H L Togo Africa L L
Guinea Africa L L Tunisia Africa H L
Guinea-Bissau Africa L L Turkey Europe H L
Haiti Latin America L H Turkmenistan Asia - -
Honduras Latin America H H Uganda Africa L L
India Asia H H Ukraine Europe H H
Indonesia Asia H H Uruguay Latin America H L
Iran Asia H L Uzbekistan Asia H H
Iraq Asia H H Vietnam Asia L L
Jordan Asia H L West Bank and Gaza Asia - -
Kazakstan Asia H L Yemen Asia H L
Kenya Africa H H Zambia Africa L L
Korea, Dem. Rep. Asia - - Zimbabwe Africa L L
Kosovo Europe - -
Notes: high/low exports/aid = above/below median exports/aid. H = High and L = Low. Countries not classified in the groups are not considered in the regressions due to missing values in one or more variables.
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General Conclusion
1 Main findings
This thesis investigated the impact of Official Development Assistance (ODA)
on the donor’s economy in the case of Switzerland. Basically, two different
approaches have been employed to this end, namely flow-of-funds and econo-
metric approaches. Moreover, regarding the econometric methodology, both
time-series and structural modeling have been used. Although distinct, these
strategies complement each other perfectly and allow to comprehensively ad-
dress this non-trivial research question. At this stage, three main findings
can be singled out.
First, development assistance can be provided in many ways. Various
components of ODA may by nature impact the donor’s aggregate demand
(GDP) to varying degrees. Chapter 1 documented and discussed extensively
all the possible connections (direct, leverage and indirect) between ODA
spending and the donor country’s aggregate demand. For 2014, the imme-
diate and final impacts of 1 Swiss franc of ODA on Swiss GDP have been
estimated to reach at least 0.70 and 1.19 Swiss franc respectively.
Second, it has been argued in the literature that providing ODA, partic-
ularly bilateral aid, may in the long run spur exports from the donor to the
recipients that may not have occurred without bilateral ODA flows. Chap-
ter 3 investigated this potential statistical link between Swiss bilateral ODA
and Swiss exports by using an econometric technique for panel data presented
and further developed in chapter 2, namely Dumitrescu-Hurlin Granger non-
causality tests. According to the results, in conformity with underlying the-
ory, a bidirectional Granger causality can be detected between Swiss bilateral
ODA and Swiss exports. This result holds regardless of the group of recip-
ients under investigation with the exception of the African countries where
Granger causality runs unidirectionally from exports to aid.
Third, based on these results, the next step was to investigate the rela-
tionship between ODA and exports in the framework of a structural model.
Chapter 4 used an augmented gravity model of trade to provide an estimate
of the magnitude of this relationship. On average, each USD of Swiss bilateral
ODA implies a return through exports (towards the same set of recipients to
which bilateral ODA is allocated) of 0.59 cents in the short run and of 1.73
USD in the long run. Returns are particularly and surprisingly high when
aid is directed to Asian countries. Indeed, a long-run return on aid of 2.72
USD is found for this latter group of countries.
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2 Policy implications
A certain number of policy lessons emerge from this thesis. First, the mere
fact that public resources are used for international aid and cooperation,
thereby diminishing available funds for other budgetary items, has policy
implications. Indeed, in democracies, the government is accountable to tax-
payers and citizens in general, who legitimately need to know the full extent
of benefits and costs of various government outlays including ODA. Focus-
ing only on the (expected) beneficial effects of aid on recipient countries to
represent the whys and wherefores of ODA results in revealing only half of
the story and blurs the image regarding the costs for the donor but also the
(per monetary unit) benefits for the recipient of ODA. The main findings
of this thesis undoubtedly stress the need for bringing into the picture the
impact of ODA on the donor country’s economy given the significant and
important positive returns on aid found in general and particularly in terms
of the long-term impact on exports.
From a purely economic perspective, our findings suggest that current
ODA contributions are sub-optimal (too low). The economic theory tells
us that the optimal amount of ODA should be determined by equalizing the
underlying marginal cost to the marginal benefit. Regarding our subject, and
according to the findings, the Swiss decision makers may well underestimate
the marginal benefit (or overestimate the marginal cost) of providing ODA
when deciding the strategy on international cooperation. Indeed, although
the economic fallouts of ODA discussed in chapter 1 are probably considered
to some extent (given that they are mentioned in the government’s proposal
submitted to the Parliament), the decision makers are hardly aware of the
positive impact ODA exerts on Swiss exports. Being fully aware of such an
additional (significant) marginal benefit would possibly facilitate the debates
and prevent ODA budget cuts for the coming years. Actually, if we fully
extend our reasoning, and given the underestimated domestic benefits of
providing ODA, contributions would have been greater in order to satisfy
the equality between marginal cost and marginal benefit of providing ODA.
In the same vein, and given the significant returns on ODA found, ODA
contributions should be considered as “investments” and not sunk costs as
many ODA critics claim. This new perception should put ODA (concept
and contributions) to the same level as alternative government spending as
for instance in infrastructure. Indeed, there is every reason to believe that if
Switzerland decides to increase its aid effort to reach the ODA/GNI objective
of 0.7% set by the United Nations, the Swiss economy will be positively
impacted in the long run, even if the funds “invested” displace inevitably
funds allocated to alternate uses.
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Switzerland has one main characteristic that makes the country different
from many other donors, namely its very low share of tied aid. It is the reason
why Switzerland is recognized internationally as a one of the most altruistic
donors. Given the low share of tied aid, one may expect low returns on
ODA through exports. On the other hand, an altruistic behavior facilitates
the development of a sound and lasting commercial relation between the
donor and the recipient country (goodwill effect). Actually, the estimated
return on aid through exports found for Switzerland is in line or even higher
than the returns documented in studies that also focus on a single country
(see for instance Martínez-Zarzoso et al. (2009) or Nowak-Lehmann et al.
(2009)). Thus, what our finding suggests is that untied aid implies the same
(or even greater) positive effect on the donor’s exports than tied aid. Thus,
untying aid, as recommended by DAC, will probably not undermine the
current returns on ODA of the other donors. The reverse is likely to be the
case.
In addition, our findings should be of particular interest for the inter-
national organizations involved in ODA, in particular the United Nations.
Indeed, Switzerland is by far not the only country to have failed to reach the
ODA target that the UN wishes the donors to attain. Thus, and in the light
of the findings, it could be worthwhile to develop a unified framework for
studies on the economic returns of ODA for the donor country. If significant
returns on ODA are found in other countries, it will undoubtedly facilitate
the achievement of the UN target.
As a concluding remark, it should be emphasized that, although it has
been shown that returns on aid through exports can vary substantially across
different groups of recipients, the aim is not to provide decision makers a list
of countries or regions towards which ODA should be directed for the sake
of the donor’s economy. We strongly believe that ODA should be allocated
as a function of recipient country specific conditions and needs.
3 General limitations and further research
Each of the four contributions presented in this thesis have drawbacks that
have already been discussed in the corresponding chapters and therefore need
not to be reiterated here. At this stage, two general limitations deserve to
be mentioned which also point to directions for future research on this topic.
First, the returns on ODA we have found in chapter 1 and 4 are, in
a way, gross returns. Indeed, we have not looked at the financing pattern
of ODA neither at the opportunity costs of providing ODA. Regarding the
former point, ODA can indeed be financed either through an increase of the
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national debt, levied taxes or reduction of other expenditure, the selected
funding model obviously affecting the net impact of ODA. Thus, a welcome
improvement would be to adjust the returns in accordance with the financing
pattern. This calibration is of particular interest to correctly compare ODA
(net) returns across donors. Furthermore, it could also be argued that returns
should take into account opportunity costs. Indeed, in the way the returns are
computed in both chapters, it is indirectly assumed than if money is not spent
on ODA, it is lost. However, if financial resources were not used for ODA,
they would obviously have been spent on other government expenditures
with possibly positive returns. Thus, an estimation of the opportunity costs
of ODA would be a good complement to reach the real (net) returns on
aid. Once more, this complement is of particular interest to compare returns
across donors given that opportunity costs can substantially differ across
them.
Second, to analyze the induced effect of ODA on the donor’s exports
(chapters 3 and 4), only bilateral ODA has been considered. The reasons
are twofold. First, data by country and region are only available for bilateral
ODA since multilateral aid is provided through international organizations
active in several recipient countries. Second, bilateral ODA is expected to be
the prime contributor to the long-term bond-creating relationship between
the donor and the recipient. This latter assumption may however be too
restrictive. Indeed, and even if it cannot be denied that by nature bilateral
ODA may count more for the long-term relationship than multilateral ODA,
the latter type of aid may bring its share of contribution to the effect. Based
on field observations, it seems rather frequent that international organiza-
tions mention to the recipient country’s authorities from which country aid’s
funding originates. Thereupon, multilateral aid behaves to some extent in the
same way as bilateral aid. The Swiss State Secretariat for Economic Affairs
(SECO) reports that Swiss multilateral ODA accounted for slightly more
than 25% of total ODA in 2017. Thus, to fully capture the long-term rela-
tionship effect, a clear improvement would be to find an appropriate method
(probably by devoting effort to collection of relevant data from international
organizations) to decompose multilateral aid by recipient and region.
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